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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of organisational characteristics on 
female executive board representation in large US corporations. The examined 
organisational characteristics act as proxies for not directly observable policies and 
practices regarding human resources at US corporations. The observed differences between 
companies provide insight into the role of these policies and practices in facilitating or 
impairing the career advancement of female management professionals in the United 
States. For the empirical analysis, data on S&P 500 companies were retrieved from S&P’s 
Compustat Fundamentals Annually and Compustat Execucomp. Subsequently, a series of 
cross-sectional regression analyses were conducted. The findings suggest that a majority of 
US corporations discriminate against female candidates for vacancies on the executive 
board based on the job attractiveness of the advertised vacancies. Furthermore, the study 
findings indicate that certain policies and practices which are more likely to be found in 
relatively larger corporations increase female executive board representation. The findings 
maintain that female executive officers might exhibit greater risk aversion with respect to 
personal income compared to their male colleagues. Finally, the existence of token effects 
is rejected. A number of limitations to the study exist. Race, ethnic background and a 
series of further personal characteristics of executive officers remain unobserved. 
Furthermore, the cross-sectional design of the study leaves temporal effects disregarded. 
Although the sample was drawn exclusively from US corporations, the conclusions are 
likely to be, at least partly, applicable to other countries. In practice, this study suggests 
that female executive officers may profit from working for relatively larger employers. 
However, female job candidates are more likely to be appointed to precarious positions on 
the executive board. Contrary to token theory, women in top management appear to 
support, rather than to hinder, the career advancement of their female colleagues. From a 
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corporate perspective, employers struggling to increase gender diversity in the composition 
of the executive board may consider the findings of this study and adapt their policies and 
practices accordingly. In particular, employers may consider adapting their compensation 
schemes for executive officers in order to increase job attractiveness for women. From a 
scientific perspective, this study contributes to a small but potentially important body of 
literature on the role of employers regarding gender diversity and equal employment 
opportunities. 
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The Influence of Organisational Characteristics on Female Executive 
Board Representation in US Corporations 
Background 
The societal and economic role of women in the United States of America has 
changed dramatically over the course of the twentieth century. The events surrounding 
World War I and the Great Depression hit the US economy hard, causing high 
unemployment rates and widespread social discontent (Powell, 2011). This also led to a 
partial disintegration of the hitherto unquestioned role division between men and women, 
which had been established during the eighteenth and nineteenth century (Lindley, 1996). 
The traditional role division was strongly influenced by Victorian beliefs and became 
institutionalised when the US economy began to prosper and a middle class emerged. The 
newly gained wealth made a more bourgeois lifestyle possible so that women could be 
kept out of paid employment and fully devote themselves to the household and the family. 
This ideal of the nineteenth century was later labelled the “Cult of Domesticity” or “Cult of 
True Womanhood” (Ibid., pp. 52 seqq.). 
With the draft of many young men and the simultaneous dramatic increase in 
armaments production in the wake of World War II, the situation on the labour market 
quickly reversed to a labour deficit. Therefore, many women found their way into paid 
employment, which resulted in a significant increase in women’s labour market 
participation (Blau et al., 2010; Jacobsen, 2007). However, the integration of women into 
the labour market was not sustainable as female workers were made redundant in great 
numbers after the war in order to facilitate the re-employment of the returning male war 
veterans. Higher positions in private business and public administration also remained 
largely inaccessible to women. This situation began to change only during the 1960ies and 
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1970ies, when the American feminist movement gained momentum and women’s rights 
became an intensively discussed issue (Hartman, 2011).  
Since then, the gender gap in employment has been constantly narrowing. Based on 
the population of employable women in the US1, the fraction of women engaged in paid 
employment increased from 40.8 per cent in 1970 to 53.6 per cent in 2010 while the 
respective fraction of men decreased during that time from 76.2 per cent to 63.7 per cent 
(U.S. Department of Labor - Bureau of Labor Statistics [BLS], 2012, pp. 8-9). Similarly, in 
2009 28.9 per cent of wives earned more than their employed or self-employed husbands, 
compared to 17.8 per cent in 1987 (Ibid., p. 78). Likewise, the educational attainment of 
women in the United States increased considerably over the last forty years. Whereas in 
1970 only 11.2 per cent of women in the civilian labour force, i.e. employed and 
unemployed, held a college degree, in 2010 36.4 per cent had received postsecondary 
education so that the fraction of women in the civilian labour force holding a college 
degree currently exceeds that of men (Ibid., pp. 23-25).  
Despite these achievements, gender inequalities still persist in the US labour market. 
Most importantly, women continue to fulfil the role of primary caretakers for their 
offspring so that, in consequence, the employment rate of the female population varies 
strongly by the presence of children in the household. In 2010, the employment rate of 
women with children aged six to seventeen was 71.2 per cent while only 57.6 per cent of 
women with children under six and 54.5 per cent with children under the age of three years 
were engaged in paid employment. Not entirely unsurprisingly, no such differences are 
reported for the male population (Ibid., p. 13). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 The employable population is defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics as the “civilian noninstitutional 
population” and includes all “persons 16 years of age and older residing in the 50 States and the District of 
Columbia who are not confined to institutions (for example, correctional facilities and residential nursing and 
mental health care facilities) and who are not on active duty in the Armed Forces” (BLS, 2012, p. 96). 
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Gender inequalities also manifest in horizontal and vertical occupational segregation. 
For example, among management professionals, approximately seventy per cent of all 
human resources and social and community service managers are female while in the 
business areas of construction and engineering only about seven per cent of all managers 
are female (Ibid., p. 28). The situation is even more disturbing in the case of hierarchical 
differences. Despite the legal and practical progress regarding women’s equal rights and 
the fact that by 2010 women constituted 46.6 per cent of the US labour force and occupied 
51.5 per cent of all management positions (including related occupations), only 14.4 per 
cent of all executive board positions in Fortune 500 companies were occupied by women 
(Soares et al., 2010). Similarly, only 3.8 per cent of all companies listed in the Fortune 500 
index had a female CEO (BLS, 2012; Catalyst, 2012). With the exception of Scandinavian 
countries, the situation in Europe is much alike. In 2012, only three per cent of all 
executive officers in Germany’s thirty biggest corporations, which are listed in the DAX, 
were women (Grabitz, 2012). Likewise, a study among Austria’s two hundred leading 
companies revealed that a mere 5.1 per cent of all executive positions are occupied by 
women (Ahmad et al., 2012, pp. 13-18).  
 
Purpose and Organisation of the Study 
The causes of the abovementioned stagnation in the professional advancement of 
women in senior positions have been intensively discussed and the question why it is 
precisely the top management level which proves to be so immensely difficult to reach for 
female professionals has been illuminated from various perspectives, including 
psychology, sociology and economics. The societal mechanisms and individual 
preferences which have likely been contributing to the current situation will be extensively 
discussed in the next chapter. However, from the standpoint of management sciences, the 
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role of employers is of particular interest and it is reasonable to assume that employers 
vary in their attractiveness to female job candidates and in the career opportunities 
available to female employees based on differences in a number of organisational 
characteristics. To my astonishment, this research area has been somewhat neglected in the 
gender discourse as only a handful of quantitative empirical contributions attempting to 
establish a connection between company characteristics and career opportunities for 
women have been recently published (e.g. Blum et al., 1994; Goodman et al., 2003; Kalev 
et al., 2006; Reskin & McBrier, 2000). I shall attempt to contribute to filling this gap with 
this thesis. As previously mentioned, executive boards are particularly interesting for my 
study because they appear to be extremely difficult to penetrate for women. Nevertheless, a 
certain number of executive positions are indeed occupied by women, which makes an 
empirical analysis possible.  
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to identify policies and practices at US 
corporations which facilitate or impair female executive board representation and to link 
these policies and practices to observable establishment characteristics. Furthermore, I 
shall attempt to determine the effects of these establishment characteristics on the presence 
of female executive officers and, based on the results of this study, to draw specific 
conclusions regarding policies and practices at US companies. Hence, I have formulated 
the following Research Question: 
RQ: Which policies and practices regarding human resources at major US corporations 
affect the career advancement of female professionals in these corporations? How are 
these policies and practices related to observable and quantitatively describable company 
characteristics and how do these company characteristics influence female executive 
board representation? 
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In order to answer the first part of the Research Question, I shall conduct a thorough 
review of the existing literature and attempt to identify the most highly relevant policies 
and practices affecting gender equality within companies. In the empirical part of the 
study, I shall subsequently attempt to reveal the actual impact of these policies and 
practices. However, since corporate policies and practices may not be easily quantifiable 
and, hence, incomparable between various firms, I shall utilise other, easily quantifiable, 
establishment characteristics as proxies for the aforementioned policies and practices.  
In the short run, this study may contribute to the growing body of literature on 
gender issues in the corporate world and help to fill the existing gap in the investigation 
into the role of establishment characteristics regarding gender equality in the labour 
market. Furthermore, students of economics and business administration of both genders 
may be inspired to conduct similar quantitative studies in the future. In the long run, 
companies might reflect upon their HR policies based on my contribution in this field and 
those firms which desire to promote the advancement of female professionals in their 
organisations could adapt their policies accordingly. 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter Two provides an 
extensive review of the literature, focusing on organisational characteristics and HR 
policies. In Chapter Three, I shall attempt to formulate a number of operational hypotheses 
in order to test the theretofore conjectured mechanisms. Chapters Four and Five will 
present the methods and results of the empirical analysis as well as discuss the obtained 
results in light of the hypotheses. Finally, Chapter Six will consist of a general discussion 
on the findings of this study.  
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Literature Review 
It has been early acknowledged that gender issues can be studied from various 
perspectives and on different levels. Holistic approaches to gender studies have identified 
the state, the labour market, the workplace and the family as relevant institutions (Bruni et 
al., 2005). Different foci of gender research can also be associated with different levels of 
analysis, namely  
• the broader environment or macro-level, including societal issues such as 
government policies or the labour market; 
• the organisation or meso-level, dealing with questions concerning a larger 
number of people, but not society as a whole, such as the workforce in one 
particular company; and 
• the individual or micro-level, relating to decisions made privately by either 
individuals or small units such as the core family (Clark & Kleyn, 2011). 
Not all approaches can be neatly assigned to one of these three levels and some 
issues may overlap one or two levels of analysis (Ibid.). Likewise, strategies for change 
may be located on all of these three levels (Rhode & Kellerman, 2007). I must also 
emphasise that this framework is not meant to be regarded as a strict classification but 
rather as a guideline among the complex net of theories on gender issues. In this chapter, I 
shall discuss a number of theories on gender inequalities, which are important for this 
thesis. I shall briefly outline the significance of individual and household decisions and 
societal issues before proceeding to organisation-level issues.  
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Holistic Approaches 
Classis approaches2 to gender studies are of ethnological and philosophical origin 
and centre on the oppression of women and patriarchy, i.e. male rule. A notable example is 
radical feminism. For radical feminists gender inequalities result from the oppression of 
women and systematic violence. Sexuality plays a very important role as patriarchy is 
achieved through the institutionalisation of heterosexual relationships, primarily but not 
exclusively through marriage, and systematic sexual violence committed against women. 
Radical feminism is holistic in nature because personal and familial relations are regarded 
as the basis for any socio-political system. This is emphasised by the slogan “the personal 
is political” (Hanisch, 1970). In contrast to this, Marxist feminism considers women to be 
objects of economic exploitation, which results from the separation of roles of men and 
women. Patriarchy is deemed to be a mere by-product of capitalist exploitation. Marxist 
feminism is also a holistic philosophical trend because inequalities on the personal and 
household level are directly derived from the economic rationale.  
Management literature follows a more pragmatic approach and even in holistic 
contributions attempts are made to deconstruct the roots of gender inequality and to 
propose strategies for improvement (Burke & Mattis, 2005; Kellerman et al., 2007). This 
approach to gender issues is similar to the one preferred by liberal feminists, who 
emphasise the huge variety of social constraints that inhibit women from reaching their 
true potential rather than focusing on one single mechanism. A notable representative of 
liberal feminism is the US American writer Betty Friedan (e.g. Friedan, 1981). 
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the gender discourse takes places on 
several levels that are intertwined and mutually dependent with some aspects spanning 
over several levels. Powell’s (2011) contribution constitutes a prime example of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 For an overview of classic gender theories see Walby (1990). 
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management literature which considers a wide range of factors determining the nature of 
gender inequalities in the workplace. It encompasses psychological basics, the role of 
gender socialisation and consequences of the resulting gender differences for the labour 
market, companies and professional teams. Additionally, Powell discussed gender-related 
problems which individuals and their families encounter. Despite this intertwinement, it 
makes sense to separate the most relevant mechanisms behind gender imbalances in order 
to better understand the different rationales behind the particular approaches and foci of 
discourse. Contrary to the first impression, most theories from the different fields of 
philosophy, psychology, economics, management studies and sociology are neither 
contradictory nor detached from one another. Instead, they focus on different aspects of the 
same scientific problem and are often argumentatively based on each other. Therefore, it is 
necessary to understand the foundational principles and ideas behind these theories and to 
reveal how they are interconnected so that a coherent wider picture can be presented as a 
basis for further empirical research.  
 
Individual and Household Decisions 
Economic literature frequently proposes the idea that gender role segregation is a 
result of decisions on the allocation of time which are made either individually or within 
the core family or household. This conclusion is based on a basic assumption of human 
capital theory according to which decisions on educational investments depend on 
expectations regarding future earnings (Blau et al., 2010; Hoffman & Averett, 2009; 
Jacobsen, 2007). 
Based on this simple statement, human capital theory further states that decisions on 
investments in human capital depend on the duration of an individual’s expected work life 
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because a longer work life justifies larger investments in human capital in order to 
maximise expected returns. Since women are more likely than men to be engaged in paid 
employment discontinuously, they will acquire less general and firm-specific human 
capital, i.e. women will invest less in their education as will firms when allocating 
resources for firm-specific training. As a result of lower professional qualifications, 
women are more likely to opt out of paid employment because the household income can 
be maximised when its members specialise and at least one of them (usually the husband) 
engages in continuous paid employment. The circle closes as households and individuals 
anticipate a lower pay-off from investments in the education of women and allocate their 
resources accordingly (Blau et al., 2010). The human capital model is capable of 
explaining horizontal and vertical gender segregation, i.e. occupational and hierarchical 
differences, purely by assuming rationality of decision making processes within the 
household. Extremist approaches even go so far as to completely dismiss the possibility of 
discrimination and explain gender differences in occupation solely by the biological fact 
that only women can give birth to children (Cigno, 2008).   
However, the human capital model is incapable of identifying the root causes of 
gender inequalities. A woman’s inability to work lasts for approximately four months 
around the date of childbirth, a relatively short period of time, which is arguably 
insufficient to account for the entirety of gender inequalities in corporate America. 
Furthermore, major differences by company size and economic sector regarding the 
number of women in top management positions have been observed (Goodman et al., 
2003), which cannot be explained by varying levels of human capital alone. Most 
importantly, it remains unclear at this point why, despite strong increases in the 
educational attainment of women in the US labour force over the past forty years (BLS, 
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2012), the proportion of women occupying positions on executive boards has increased 
only marginally.  
Apart from human capital theory, a considerable number of how-to books have 
recently become popular. Although these books do not apply strict economic reasoning, 
they also focus on individual and household decisions. For example, Farrell (2005) argues 
that women themselves are chiefly responsible for being disadvantaged in professional life 
because they make “wrong” decisions regarding education and career. Farrell further 
suggests that more women should push into male dominated professions by enrolling in 
study fields such as engineering instead of liberal arts in order to improve their economic 
situation. He also suggests that women should consider joining the military as they can 
expect a higher income at a lower risk of dying compared to their male colleagues. The 
approach of how-to books can be regarded as a valuable contribution to the gender 
discourse in that these books visualise the individual responsibility every woman has for 
her life. Furthermore, they attempt to offer support to women by reflecting upon typical 
female choices which may be detrimental to women’s professional development. However, 
similar to the human capital model, how-to books also disregard wider societal norms and 
constraints, which are imposed on women and play an important role in gender studies.  
 
Societal Level 
In order to understand the role of firms in sustaining or reducing gender imbalances, 
it is necessary to acknowledge that gender is a social concept as opposed to a biological 
category. Although sex and gender are closely related notions, sex refers to the nature of 
human beings while gender refers to their nurture. Therefore, gender can be regarded as a 
social category, a linguistic artefact, a theoretical concept and, most importantly, as a 
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feminist invention that became a subject of the gender discourse in the mid 1970ies (Bruni 
et al., 2005). The New Oxford American Dictionary provides the following definition of 
its usage in English: 
“The word gender has been used since the 14th century primarily as a 
grammatical term, referring to the classes of noun in Latin, Greek, 
German, and other languages designated as masculine, feminine, or 
neuter. It has also been used since the 14th century in the sense ‘the state 
of being male or female,’ but this did not become a common standard use 
until the mid 20th century. Although the words gender and sex both have 
the sense ‘the state of being male or female,’ they are typically used in 
slightly different ways: sex tends to refer to biological differences, while 
gender tends to refer to cultural or social ones.” 
Sex describes a biological characteristic, which cannot normally be changed and 
which constitutes a fixed and easily recognisable trait. In contrast to this, gender defines an 
individual’s affiliation to a certain social group. Therefore, gender is based upon social 
interaction and is subject to social changes. It is a malleable trait which is socially and 
culturally shaped. 
The important personal decisions which I discussed in the previous chapter are not 
made independently from individuals’ surroundings but are based on their social identity. 
Social identity and social environment influence one another so that individuals follow the 
example of the organisations for which they work and develop their job identity 
accordingly (Germain & Scandura, 2005). However, men and women are socialised to 
conform to different ideals based on their gender. As a result, men are more frequently 
perceived as agentic, ambitious, self-confident, self-sufficient, dominant and assertive, 
whereas women are typically considered to be communal, kind, helpful, selfless, warm and 
gentle (Carli & Eagly, 2007). Scientific contributions to the discussion on gender 
differences in a professional context strongly support the observation that women are 
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perceived to exhibit mainly communal traits while men are generally perceived as agentic 
(Giscombe, 2007; Oshagbemi & Gill, 2003; Pittinsky et al., 2007; Rohmann & Rowold, 
2009). In other words, men are socialised to “get ahead” while women are socialised to 
“get along” (Germain & Scandura, 2005).  
Until now, my analysis of gender differences has been based on findings on gender 
socialisation in professional settings. However, these observations also provide insight into 
the role of women in US society in general. It is still widely accepted in the US that men 
assume the role of breadwinners within the family while women act as their nurturing 
supporters. The husband, who frequently engages in full-time paid employment outside the 
home, receives support for his career ambitions from his wife, who is often a full-time 
homemaker (Rhode & Kellerman, 2007). The reverse situation, in which families prioritise 
a working woman’s career objectives and the husband reduces his own professional 
aspirations in order to support his wife’s career, is rather unusual and contradicts 
established social norms (Ibid.). Additionally, society puts pressure on both men and 
women to conform to these norms (Ibid.) and if individuals act in opposition to their 
gender role, internal and external conflicts are likely to arise. Evidence from qualitative 
ethnological research reveals that internal conflicts can manifest in women as feelings of 
guilt of not conforming to one’s own ideal of a good wife as well as loneliness and 
emotional isolation from the family (Kaufmann, 2008). Moreover, external conflicts are 
likely to arise if the career advancement of women begins to threaten the self-image of 
male-dominated groups and defensive mechanisms are triggered in response (Lee, 2000). 
Such defensive reactions may come from potential employers (e.g. exclusionary job 
advertisements) as well as from friends and family members and can range from mild 
scepticism to open hostility (Ibid.). For all of the aforementioned reasons, different job 
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identities of men and women are likely to be directly related to distinct gender roles which 
are deeply rooted in US society.  
It is possible that gender differences in socialisation also lead to different leadership 
styles of male and female executive officers. Scholars (most notably Rosener, 1990) found 
differences in leadership style based on leaders’ gender and some meta-studies 
(Appelbaum et al., 2003; Trinidad & Normore, 2005) indicate that these differences reflect 
divergent approaches to people management, which may correspond to gender differences 
in socialisation. However, studies which attempt to show variations in leadership style 
based on leaders’ gender share a common methodical flaw as data on leaders’ behaviour 
can only be gathered through evaluations by other people, be it followers, superiors or 
outsiders (e.g. van Engen et al., 2001; Kulich et al., 2007; Rohmann & Rowold, 2009). 
Therefore, actual gender differences in leadership style cannot be separated from 
stereotypical assumptions about men and women in senior management positions, to which 
all respondents are susceptible and which inevitably influence research outcomes. 
Experimental findings confirm these reservations by revealing that women receive worse 
evaluations than their male colleagues on their results when their results are in fact equal 
(Carli & Eagly, 2007).  
Stereotypes also function as a reinforcing mechanism for existing social norms 
because role conformity is rewarded and disconformity sanctioned. Carli & Eagly (2007) 
show that women who use stereotypically male leadership techniques like assertive speech 
are penalised by negative feedback. When the proportion of women in a distinct 
professional group, such as the executive board, increases beyond a certain threshold, 
unfavourable stereotypes may be overcome. However, if women (or any other minority 
group) are too small in number to exert any significant influence on existing 
preconceptions about themselves, perceptions of their behaviour and character which 
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deviate from the prevalent stereotypes may be distorted to fit the stereotypical 
generalisation (Kanter, 1977). Apart from assimilation, i.e. the mental distortion of reality 
to fit the stereotype, very small minority groups, also called “tokens” (Ibid.), may be 
highly susceptible to “moulding” (Pittinsky et al., 2007). In contrast to assimilation, 
moulding describes the alteration of the actual behaviour of tokens. If pressure to conform 
to specific stereotypes is strong, women, who constitute a minority in senior management, 
may be unable to withstand it and ultimately change their behaviour to conform to the 
expected behavioural patterns (Ibid.). According to these expected behavioural patterns 
female executives are associated with communal and “soft” character traits.  
The observation that men and women behave differently in leadership roles has 
resulted in theories on distinct female leadership styles (Helgesen, 1990; Rosener, 1990; 
Stanford et al., 1995). Most importantly, women are commonly believed to employ 
transformational leadership (Bass, 1985; Burns, 1978), i.e. leadership through emphasising 
good interpersonal relations and the empowerment of followers as opposed to “traditional 
male” leadership approaches based on authority and followers’ obedience. Such theories 
on female leadership qualities are based on positive assumptions about the abilities of 
women and intend to acknowledge their contributions in senior management. However, on 
closer examination it becomes evident that theories on female leadership are founded on 
the same stereotypes about the communal personality of women which I discussed in the 
previous paragraphs. Therefore, theories stating the distinctiveness of women’s leadership 
approaches could be considered as problematic since communal qualities such as caring 
and nurturing may be inadequate or insufficient in difficult situations which require 
executive officers to exhibit resilience to confrontation and resolute decision-making. The 
assumption that women are different as managers due to their gender is potentially 
discriminating because it can serve as a justification to exclude women from key positions 
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and confine them to supporting functions. The proposed alternative to this form of hidden 
discrimination through positive but precarious stereotyping lies in de-gendering leadership 
by abstaining from gender-based stereotypes and acknowledging that capable leaders of 
both genders can learn from one another (Pittinsky et al., 2007). 
 From an economic perspective, gender inequalities at the societal level can influence 
individual decision-making, as discussed in the previous chapter, but can also manifest 
directly at collective levels such as the state or a specific industry. Blau et al. (2010) 
provide an overview of the most established models of gender-based labour market 
discrimination, which also explain possible causes of the gender pay gap. Although the 
gender pay gap is not a major issue of this study, it is nevertheless relevant to some extent 
in that lower expected income levels inhibit women from realising their full potential, as 
previously discussed in the analysis of the human capital model.  
Economists’ attempts to formulate a theory explaining the mechanisms of gender 
discrimination in the labour market date back to the 1970s. In a theory that blends in well 
with the discussed possibility of stereotypical assumptions about leadership qualities of 
women, Becker (1971) early hypothesised that employers and employees alike might have 
a “taste for discrimination”. He argues that discriminating employers associate hiring 
female workers with additional costs. In consequence, women are paid below their 
productivity, in contrast to their male colleagues, who are paid higher wages according to 
their productivity. Likewise, male employees might hold a negative opinion about women 
and associate additional costs with having female co-workers, in which case the non-
discriminating employer must either pay relatively higher wages to men or segregate jobs 
by gender. Gender-based job segregation has been observed in the past and can lead to 
overcrowding (Bergmann, 1974). Overcrowding is believed to occur when women are 
pushed into a limited number of professions, in which case a relatively low level of 
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demand for workers is met by a high level of supply. In consequence, wages in female-
dominated professions will be significantly lower compared to male-dominated professions 
requiring similar levels of personal qualification (Ibid.).  
In a similar vein, the dual labour market model suggests that women are 
predominantly employed in secondary labour markets (Doeringer & Piore, 1971). The 
notion of secondary labour markets refers to internal labour markets and describes jobs 
which require lower levels of general and firm-specific qualifications and which, 
concomitantly, entail lower pay, higher employee turnover and curtailed opportunities for 
promotion, as opposed to primary jobs which require high qualification levels but offer 
high pay and good career perspectives. Doeringer and Piore argue that internal labour 
markets are inflexible so that women may not easily access primary jobs. In consequence, 
gender-based assignment to primary and secondary jobs may become institutionalised, 
fostering horizontal and vertical segregation.  
Finally, some scholars argue that employers are inclined to discriminate against 
women based on statistical information (Aigner & Cain, 1977; Arrow, 1973; Phelps, 
1972). Since employers are usually forced to make employment decisions based on 
incomplete information, they resort to certain easily observable characteristics such as 
gender as signals of professional qualifications such as productivity or leadership qualities. 
Unfortunately, this form of generalisation is prone to feedback effects, which may 
ultimately lead to statistical discrimination (Arrow, 1973). For example, if an employer is 
prejudiced and believes that women are more likely than men to quit work, she will not 
offer firm-specific training to female employees. As a result, women will remain in 
secondary jobs, and based on the human capital model, lower pay and limited career 
perspectives will incentivise female workers to leave paid employment voluntarily. If this 
scenario repeats on a large scale, women will have a statistically shorter tenure. The crucial 
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point is that although the employer’s conclusion on female employees’ greater likelihood 
of quitting proves to be correct, it is caused by her own discriminating decision not to 
support women’s career advancement (Blau et al., 2010).  
Apart from statistical discrimination, feedback effects also occur between the labour 
market in general and the household. On the one hand, gender discrimination in the labour 
market influences the gender division of labour in the family while, on the other hand, 
household decisions, which are influenced by this discrimination, reinforce the traditional 
division of gender roles in the labour market and the perception of women as low profile 
employees (Ibid.).  
 
Organisational Level 
From the perspective of personnel economics and HR management, gender 
inequalities on the organisational level are of particular interest. The firm or organisation 
constitutes a micro-environment for executive officers, which is closely connected to the 
society and the legal and political environment. However, organisations have their distinct 
rules, cultures and internal politics. As such, they stand between the societal level and the 
individual level. Individual or household decisions are too weak to induce change in a big 
company, however, in a large market even big companies are too small themselves to 
induce social change. Therefore, individual employees must adapt to their company, but 
the company must adapt to the labour market. In this chapter, I shall elaborate on existing 
findings on the impact of organisational characteristics and practices on the career 
advancement of female employees and, in particular, executive officers. 
Corporate culture 
Corporate culture. Culture is a very broad area and should be subdivided in any 
serious discussion. It is influenced by stereotypes about the perceived role of women in the 
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company (Giscombe, 2007) and may seriously facilitate or inhibit the advancement of 
female managers. Cultural barriers for women may range from subtleties, e.g. particular 
emphasis on male values, a negative attitude towards female managers and a belief that 
women do not “fit in” to more evident barriers, such as inflexible workplace structures, 
and, finally, to outright discrimination and harassment (Burke, 2005; Clark & Kleyn, 
2011). Lee (2000) presents empirical evidence on how cultural practices can effectively 
exclude women almost entirely from an organisation. A corporate culture which is 
unsupportive of women primarily manifests in inflexible workplace structures, insufficient 
mentoring and exclusion from predominantly informal networks (Burke, 2005; Clark & 
Kleyn, 2011; Mattis, 2005). Furthermore, the degree of formalisation of procedures in a 
company has been identified as a pivotal element of corporate culture. It is likely to be 
partly responsible for gender-based discrimination since highly formalised personnel 
practices prevent subjectivity and gender-based favouritism (Reskin & McBrier, 2000). 
Culture is a malleable phenomenon that changes over the course of time. Some 
scholars predict that the belief in male superiority, and with it the emphasis on masculine 
traits, is about to erode because of changes in US society and national culture (e.g. Burke, 
2005). However, societal influence on corporate culture may vary greatly, even within one 
country. Many divergent cultures, beliefs and lifestyles exist among the regions of the US, 
which may influence the perceived role of women in the corporate world very differently. 
Likewise, the attitudes towards women may differ across economic sectors. HR practices 
that are supportive of women have been frequently found in healthcare, education and 
banking as opposed to manufacturing, mining and broadcasting (Rosen et al., 1989). 
Similarly, the situation of women employed in the public sector appears to be better 
compared to those employed in the private sector, which may reflect a higher degree of 
 19 
formalisation of HR policies in the public sector (Baron et al., 1986; Reskin & McBrier, 
2000). 
Cultural change can also be induced by the organisation itself by addressing the 
aforementioned inhibitors to women’s progress. Two necessary conditions must be 
fulfilled in order to achieve cultural change from within the company: First, accountability 
must be defined and it must be clear who is responsible for achieving predefined goals in 
reducing gender discrimination. Second, top management must be fully committed to the 
intended changes. Measures to reduce gender inequalities must be supported by the chief 
executive and clearly linked to the corporate strategy (Burke, 2005; Mays et al., 2005). 
Interestingly, initiatives to induce cultural change do not necessarily need to be aimed at 
the inclusion of women or the diversification of the workforce in order to improve the 
situation of female employees (Rutherford, 2005). Meyerson et al. (2007) present the case 
of an offshore platform, where the goal was to align the corporate culture with 
contemporary values in order to improve safety on the platform. Greater acceptance of 
female co-workers emerged as a side effect.  
Corporate culture may be regarded as a set of principles which allows a firm to 
decide on and to justify rewards, incentives, punishments etc. As such, it performs an 
important strategic function for long-term success (Uttley & Hooper, 1993). Corporate 
culture has also been shown to influence reputation, which in turn has a positive 
moderating effect on financial performance (Flatt & Kowalczyk, 2008). Furthermore, 
innovations in corporate culture may generally increase a company’s innovation capacities 
(Shieh & Wang, 2010). Therefore, it may be particularly important for organisations in 
highly competitive environments to adapt their corporate culture. In general, it is 
reasonable to assume that the necessity to adapt the corporate culture may vary 
substantially across different companies based on the level of competition, pressure to 
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innovate, public visibility etc. For example, an IT start-up in Silicon Valley may exhibit a 
greater propensity for cultural change than a monopolistically acting state-owned utility 
company. Hence, companies’ willingness to invest in gender diversity and to support equal 
opportunities may vary considerably across corporate America. 
Responsiveness and flexibility of workplace arrangements 
Responsiveness and flexibility of workplace arrangements. Women frequently 
suffer from barriers that prevent them from reaching senior management positions. 
Research conducted among young professionals in the UK reveals that among respondents 
under the age of thirty-five the fraction of women in senior positions is greater than the 
fraction of men. However, among surveyed professionals over the age of thirty-five the 
situation is reciprocally different (Altman et al., 2005).  
An analysis of the different career paths of men and women may provide a possible 
explanation for this gap. As previously discussed, women are likely to follow 
discontinuous career paths governed by decisions on the allocation of time (Blau et al., 
2010; Hewlett, 2007; Nelson & Michie, 2004). Furthermore, midlife, which covers the 
approximate age range between thirty-five and fifty (Gordon & Whelan-Berry, 2005), is 
regarded as the most defining stage in life with respect to personal decisions affecting 
women’s careers. Midlife does not necessarily define a fixed age range but describes a 
period in which young management professionals have already established a certain level 
of expertise in their field and may have made first decisions on having children of their 
own. However, in contrast to late-life, individual health concerns are usually not yet grave 
and the focus of career planning is on further development as opposed to considerations 
regarding retirement and life thereafter (Gordon & Whelan-Berry, 2005; Hewlett, 2007; 
Kaufmann, 2008). Midlife offers a wide range of options and career opportunities. 
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Individuals can focus on their careers, develop their full potential and invest considerable 
time and effort in advancing from senior management to the executive board.  
However, as previously noted, achieving their career goals may be extremely 
difficult for female managers as they are usually expected to take primary care of the 
family and to run the household. Furthermore, midlife frequently puts women in a 
“sandwich” position, where they must care for their young children and, simultaneously, 
for their parents or parents in law (Gordon & Whelan-Berry, 2005). Pressure and lack of 
support and understanding from the partner and family members for career ambitions may 
cause women to relinquish their career aspirations. The incentive to temporarily 
discontinue paid employment is particularly strong when the partner’s income is 
sufficiently high. Additionally, female managers may be confronted with push-factors to 
quit if they perceive their contribution as undervalued due to gender-based discrimination 
and become dissatisfied (Hewlett, 2007). 
Problems may also occur when women attempt to re-enter paid employment because 
discontinuities in employment are perceived by the labour market as a negative signal 
indicating an inclination to quit one’s job (Blau et al., 2010). In order to avoid financial 
penalties in the form of lower compensation at re-entry, 63 per cent of the women 
surveyed by Hewlett (2007) chose not to take time off from their jobs. Instead, many 
respondents decided to take the “scenic route” at some point in their life by accepting 
fewer responsibilities, working part-time etc., thereby slowing down their professional 
development. Furthermore, some respondents made efforts to keep a low profile and dodge 
offers for promotion in order to avoid being compelled to decline a promotion, which 
would also be perceived as a negative signal regarding an employee’s commitment to the 
company (Ibid.). Women’s inability to reconcile career aspirations and familial 
responsibilities results in a false perception of women’s real potential in management 
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professions. In light of the previously discussed economic theories on gender 
discrimination, the institutionalisation of women as employees in secondary jobs is a likely 
yet unsettling consequence.  
It has been suggested that the curricula vitae of highly successful female managers 
may differ from those of typical female employees. Branson (2009) analysed the 
background of a series of well-known female chief executive officers and found that many 
of them have their first child either at an early age, i.e. in their twenties, or very late. Some 
high achieving women like Carleton Fiorina, former CEO at Hewlett-Packard, choose not 
to have children at all. Branson argues that avoiding career interruptions due to 
childbearing and early childrearing during early midlife can improve career prospects 
substantially. Furthermore, men can support their female life partners by displaying respect 
and understanding for their professional ambitions and accepting a part of the familial 
responsibilities in a relationship (Gordon & Whelan-Berry, 2005). However, it is by no 
means a necessity for any women to have a male partner. In fact, couples may have no 
other choice than to separate if both partners have different visions of an intimate 
relationship that are too discrepant to allow re-negotiation of the “provisions” of their 
existing relationship (Ibid.). Finally, it is vaguely suggested that high-achieving women 
may prefer to adopt children instead of procreating naturally (Branson, 2009). Adoption 
might offer two substantial advantages. First, the time of adoption can be more easily 
planned than pregnancy while eliminating career interruptions and, second, motherhood 
may not be easily observed by the company, reducing the exposure to potential gender-
based discrimination.  
While good career planning is certainly important for anybody aspiring a seat on the 
executive board, it is not sufficient to ensure equal opportunities for female employees. 
Much of the responsibility lies with companies, which can facilitate the professional 
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advancement of women within the organisation by taking a series of measures allowing for 
greater flexibility of workplace arrangements and greater responsiveness towards women’s 
life cycle-related needs. Possible measures include child care support by offering 
subsidised on-site or off-site day care, introducing flexible working hours and supporting 
options of parental leave for male and female parents alike (Rosen et al., 1989). 
Furthermore, it is suggested that employers should be attentive to employees’ needs and 
reduce existing discrepancies between the fringe benefits which are desired by female 
employees and those actually offered by the company (Boeker et al., 1985). In fact, 
assistance in reconciling childcare and career may be of particular importance in 
promoting equal opportunities. Moss (1992) argues that the historical negligence of 
childcare support in the UK resulted in the unfavourable situation for working women 
which I described at the beginning of this chapter. Finally, firms are also responsible for 
supporting the re-integration of their female employees who have decided to take a leave 
of absence due to family commitments (Rhode & Kellerman, 2007). 
Formal mentoring and networking programmes 
Formal mentoring and networking programmes. A mentor is a senior, more 
experienced employee who supports a junior employee, the mentee (or protégé/protégée), 
by offering advice and counselling (Germain & Scandura, 2005). The role of a mentor 
transcends that of an “instructor” in that mentoring includes psychological and social 
support as opposed to a mere transfer of formal knowledge. Thus, the mentee benefits from 
the mentor’s wisdom and contemporary mentoring can be regarded as a way of transferring 
social capital (Bozeman & Feeney, 2007). Although mentoring had existed for a long time, 
it was not until the second half of the 20th century that it was discovered as an instrument 
of supporting women who aspire leadership positions3. Today, mentoring is one of the 
most widely accepted instruments used to integrate and support women in a professional !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 See Roche (1979) for one of the earliest empirical analyses identifying the immense importance of 
mentoring for the career development of female executive officers. 
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context. Existing research confirms that mentoring increases job satisfaction and facilitates 
job success (De Vries et al., 2006), aides integration into the organisation, boosts loyalty 
and commitment, stimulates productivity and career advancement measured by the number 
of promotions (Blake-Beard, 2005; Germain & Scandura, 2005) and reduces turnover rates 
with a particular emphasis on reducing voluntary turnover (Blake-Beard, 2005; Clark & 
Kleyn, 2011; Germain & Scandura, 2005). Case studies (e.g. Blake-Beard, 2005; Mays et 
al., 2005) further corroborate the findings on the practical value of mentoring.  
Interestingly, mentoring is not only beneficial for mentees but also has direct positive 
effects on mentors and employers alike. Mentors receive an opportunity to practice their 
people management skills, especially enabling male managers to develop a better 
understanding of the concerns of female mentees (Blake-Beard, 2005). Furthermore, 
mentees frequently regard their mentors as role models. Hence, for the mentee the process 
of mentoring is also one of interiorising the company’s corporate culture, which constitutes 
a form of organisational socialisation serving the purposes of the company (De Vries et al., 
2006; Germain & Scandura, 2005).  
Intuitively, mentoring relationships are most effective when pairing occurs naturally, 
i.e. when both the mentor and the mentee agree to work together based certain 
commonalities such as shared interests, educational, social or ethnical background as well 
as gender (Rhode & Kellerman, 2007). Such informal mentoring relationships are 
sometimes favoured because mentees demonstrate self-determination by choosing their 
mentors individually (Germain & Scandura, 2005). However, informal mentoring has also 
been criticised for encouraging homosocial reproduction, which means that women, who 
are already marginalised in senior management (Kanter, 1977), would be further excluded 
if the pairing of mentors and mentees occurred on the basis of shared characteristics such 
as gender. A possible solution for this problem is the employment of formal mentoring 
 25 
programmes, which allow the assignment of mentors based on objective criteria (Mattis, 
2005). However, such programmes have also been criticised because they imply a forced 
relationship between the mentor and his or her mentee. If the relationship is not 
characterised by mutual sympathy and understanding and a “professional friendship” does 
not develop between the mentor and the mentee, the important psychosocial aspect, which 
distinguishes mentoring from instruction, might come short. Likewise, the facilitation of 
socialisation may not be possible if the mentor is not accepted as a role model by the 
mentee due to great interpersonal dissimilarities (Germain & Scandura, 2005).  
Contrary to these reservations, empirical research conducted by Kalev et al. (2006) 
confirms the effectiveness of formal mentoring in increasing the presence of women of 
African American origin in management. Kalev’s findings show that those groups of 
people who face the greatest threat of social exclusion in an organisation profit from 
formal mentoring programmes the most. African American women may experience social 
isolation in senior management because of both their gender and their ethnic background, 
as opposed to African American men and white women, who share at least one potentially 
discriminating attribute with the dominant group. Therefore, African American women 
may be most likely to benefit from a mentor who belongs to the dominant group of white 
men. The research findings also support the preliminary conclusion that formal mentoring 
programmes are to be favoured over alternative instruments if social inclusion of those 
groups who face the greatest risk of social isolation is the aim. 
Another obstacle which women in senior management frequently encounter is the 
exclusion from informal networks. In many cases, important decisions are not made during 
official meetings but within unofficial networks. Furthermore, the so called “old boys 
clubs” provide mutual support for their participants and may imply a strong sense of 
loyalty among the members (Clark & Kleyn, 2011). In order to address this imbalance and 
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provide female management professionals with easier personal access to senior members 
of the dominant group, especially male executive officers, on the one hand and to facilitate 
the exchange of knowledge among female managers on the other hand, many companies 
have established formal networks (Gremmen & Benschopp, 2011). Successful networking 
initiatives designed to support the social inclusion of women into the organisation have 
been observed at several companies including Shell (Mays et al., 2005), IBM, KPMG 
(Gremmen & Benschopp, 2011) and HP (Mattis, 2005). Empirical research also confirms 
that female managers benefit from formal networking programmes (Kalev et al., 2006). 
The reviewed literature identifies formal mentoring and networking programmes as 
indispensable for promoting the social inclusion of female employees. However, these 
instruments require a substantial commitment to diversity management and to the 
development of human capital within the organisation (Burke, 2005; Kalev et al., 2006). 
As such, they cannot be separated from the previously discussed organisational issues but 
must be accompanied by developments in the corporate culture and well-defined 
organisational responsibility in order to substantially reduce gender-based discrimination 
on the organisational level.  
The glass cliff phenomenon 
The glass cliff phenomenon. The glass cliff is a recently developed concept based 
upon the notion of the glass ceiling. The theory states that although an increasing number 
of women manage to break through the glass ceiling, they do so under less favourable 
conditions compared to their male colleagues and become disproportionately often 
promoted to particularly difficult and precarious positions on the executive board (Haslam 
& Ryan, 2008; Ryan & Haslam, 2005; 2007). As previously noted, people stereotypically 
assume that certain leadership qualities are linked to gender. In a business context, these 
stereotypes are further amplified by people’s tendency to exaggerate the importance of 
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leaders. Due to romanticised mental concepts about leaders most people attribute outcomes 
to an easily identifiable person holding a leadership position rather than to a complex 
amalgam of various factors, which would be a more truthful representation of reality 
(Meindl & Ehrlich, 1987; Meindl et al., 1985). Therefore, financial success is more likely 
to be ascribed to the CEO or the executive board than to external factors, such as market 
development, or non-controllable factors, such as decisions made by the previous 
management (Kulich et al., 2007; Kulich et al., 2011).  
Combined with stereotypes about men as being particularly agentic and task-
oriented, the perceived influence of leaders creates a picture of men as being better 
qualified to serve on the executive board. However, the surmised discovery of leadership 
qualities unique to women (Helgesen, 1990; Rosener, 1990; Stanford et al., 1995) lead to a 
series of speculations according to which female executives are particularly well suited to 
lead companies in critical situations because of certain character traits which are 
stereotypically associated with women, such as understanding, helpfulness, intuition, 
creativity or cheerfulness (Ryan & Haslam, 2005; 2007). The long known slogan “think 
manager – think male” has henceforth been supplemented by a new slogan: “think crisis – 
think female” (Ryan & Haslam, 2007). Anecdotal evidence from politics reveals that Kim 
Campbell, former Prime Minister of Canada, could only become the first and hitherto only 
female prime minister in her country because she assumed leadership of the conservative 
party in times of serious troubles (Ryan et al., 2010). Experimental research conducted by 
Haslam & Ryan (2008) supports earlier speculations that women are likely to be promoted 
into precarious leadership positions. The study reveals the existence of gender differences 
in perceived leadership ability and suitability of individuals contingent upon past company 
performance. The participants in the experiments decided to hire the female candidate for a 
leadership position when company performance was presented as declining, however, 
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when company performance was improving, the male candidate was selected. Similar 
results were independently reproduced by Bruckmüller & Branscombe (2010). 
Stereotypical assumptions about women as particularly adept leaders during crises 
may not be the sole cause of the glass cliff. Ryan & Haslam (2007) identify three probable 
origins of the glass cliff phenomenon that are related to numerous mechanisms previously 
discussed in this thesis. They include 
• tolerance of gender-based discrimination in the organisation caused by a lack of 
commitment to gender equality, 
• group dynamics which are disadvantageous to women caused by insufficient HR 
policies to counter the social exclusion of female professionals, such as formal 
mentoring or networking programmes, and 
• stereotypes and cultural beliefs present in the company according to which 
women are unsuited for leadership. 
Furthermore, the extremely low fraction of women serving as executive officers 
implies that female executives have a weaker bargaining power compared to their male 
colleagues. Therefore, female management professionals may find themselves under a 
great pressure to accept any executive position which is offered to them. Even a less 
attractive assignment may be difficult to reject as women may easily be accused of 
“looking a gift horse in the mouth” (Ibid., p. 558) if they refuse to accept an offer and, in 
consequence, be ignored at future internal promotions. 
The systematic appointment of women to leadership positions in times of crisis 
results in a vicious circle in that any promotion of a women to the executive board bears 
the risk of signalling economic difficulties even if no objective symptoms for decline exist. 
This effect reinforces the glass cliff as firms are likely to abstain from promoting women to 
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the executive board in fear of negative market reactions, unless a real crisis develops, in 
which case the appointment of women to the executive board underpins the common 
perception that female executives are primarily employed in the context of negative 
business development (Haslam et al., 2010). 
Public opinion and corporate social responsibility 
Public opinion and corporate social responsibility. Companies are under a hitherto 
unknown pressure to comply with expectations regarding corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) (Farache & Perks, 2010; O’Rourke, 2003; Tench et al., 2007). This pressure is 
primarily exercised by the general public (Lewis, 2001) and stakeholders (Farache & 
Perks, 2010). Among stakeholders, shareholders play a particularly important role in 
corporate America. Since the adoption of rule 14a-8 by the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in 1946 large companies are obliged to include shareholder resolutions 
in their annual proxy statements, which has frequently been used to exercise pressure 
regarding social issues. Prominent cases from the 1960ies include resolutions calling for 
the non-discrimination of the African American minority and the non-proliferation of 
weapons during the Vietnam War. In 1970, a US court ruling obliged Dow Chemical, 
despite the company’s resistance, to include a shareholder resolution in their proxy 
statement demanding the discontinuation of napalm production. However, it must be noted 
that firms can reject resolutions addressing issues which fall into the category of 
management functions, which generally prevents resolutions on labour or employment 
issues (O’Rourke, 2003).  
Outside pressure on private companies regarding gender issues also originates from 
several non-governmental organisations (NGOs), such as Catalyst4, as well as government 
agencies, such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). It has been !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Catalyst is a US based NGO committed to supporting women in their professional life. See also 
http://www.catalyst.org/ 
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reported that some NGOs acquire shares specifically for the purpose of exercising pressure 
through instruments designated for shareholders (Ibid.). Similarly, churches and other 
religious organisations can influence certain company policies. Furthermore, large 
institutional investors increasingly commit themselves to “responsible ownership” and 
expect companies in which they invest to comply with ethical standards (Ibid.). Cultural 
changes in the US, which manifested in legal and societal advances since 1945, have 
further increased the public awareness of gender issues5. Specifically, a series of court 
rulings during the mid and late 20th century helped to advance civil rights and to reduce 
gender-based discrimination (Frymer, 2003). 
Companies may not be able to ignore public demands for social responsibility, 
including gender equality, without diminishing their legitimacy. According to social 
contract theory (e.g. Rousseau, 1762), “society allows the company to operate as long as it 
behaves in accordance with society’s norms and values (Farache & Perks, 2010, p. 236).” 
A large discrepancy between existing social norms and a company’s actual behaviour 
entails a legitimacy threat that can even become existential (Ibid.). Specifically, declining 
social acceptance of a company’s actions can manifest in a lower attractiveness for 
potential employees. In a survey study, Turban & Greening (1997) found that job seekers 
are influenced in their decisions by the public perception of companies’ efforts regarding 
CSR. The study authors further conclude that job seekers, who must evaluate potential 
employers based on incomplete information, regard companies’ attitudes towards CSR as a 
signal of working conditions. Furthermore, social identity theory states that individuals 
will identify themselves and be identified by others with the organisation for which they 
work. Anticipation of these spillover effects from the organisation to the individual may 
also influence employer attractiveness (Ibid.). A questionnaire-based survey among US !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 For an overview of the development of the women’s movement in the US see Blau et al. (2010) and 
Hartman (2011). 
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universities conducted by Smith et al. (2004) produced similar results and showed that 
mandatory affirmative action plans have a particular influence on employer attractiveness. 
It is also reasonable to assume that firms anticipate the impact of social legitimacy on 
employer attractiveness. Hence, major companies are likely to invest in CSR and inform 
the public about their efforts in order to increase their attractiveness to potential future 
hires (Farache & Perks, 2010).  
 
Preliminary Summary 
Before continuing to the empirical part of this thesis, it is appropriate to provide a 
brief summary of the findings of the literature review. Gender-related differences 
inevitably manifest on the individual level and become observable as differences in 
educational, professional and family-related choices. However, a mere observation of the 
divergence between the decisions of men and women is insufficient. Rather, the roots of 
gender-related inequalities must be sought at the societal level. Socialisation, a system of 
reward and punishment, shapes the social behaviour and beliefs of the members of any 
society and may result in gender differences in various areas such as job identity or the 
(self-)perception of one’s role in the family. Social and cultural values and beliefs also 
penetrate the labour market, resulting in various forms of gender inequalities, which are 
frequently disadvantageous to female professionals. 
Organisations have their own distinct characteristics, which may vary considerably 
between different organisations. As such, organisations stand between the individual, 
which is the subject of psychology, and society, which is the subject of sociology and 
economics. Each company – or any other organisation – has its distinct set of written and 
unwritten rules, norms and practices, which define its corporate culture and which may 
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facilitate or impede the professional advancement of women in the organisation. However, 
since corporate culture is an overly general term, it was further divided into four areas of 
analysis and discussed in this chapter. In the following chapters, I shall empirically analyse 
these problem areas in an attempt to uncover the influence of organisational characteristics 
of US corporations on the career opportunities of women in top management.  
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Hypotheses 
In the previous chapter, I discussed theoretical and empirical findings regarding the 
impact of organisational characteristics on the advancement of women in management in 
the United States. In this chapter, I shall develop a series of testable hypotheses based on 
these findings. The purpose of these hypotheses is to learn how procedures, structures and 
resources in a company influence the career advancement of female managers by analysing 
the statistical probabilities of women to serve as executive officers. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Company Size 
As noted in my analysis of the role of corporate culture, the degree of formalisation 
in an organisation may greatly impact the objectivity of personnel-related decisions 
because highly formalised practices prevent subjectivity and gender-based favouritism 
(Reskin & McBrier, 2000). Firms which employ a large number of people are likely to be 
compelled to establish common rules regarding the evaluation of employees and job 
candidates in order to ensure a certain level of quality among the workforce while in 
smaller firms individual workers’ input may be more easily observable and strongly 
formalised HR practices may be unnecessary. Hence, firm size may serve as an indicator 
of the degree of formalisation of a company’s HR practices (Goodman et al., 2003).  
Furthermore, large enterprises may have more resources available to provide 
personnel development programmes including formal mentoring and networking initiatives 
(Ibid.). Contrary to this assumption, Kalev et al. (2006) find negative effects of great firm 
size on the effectiveness of HR development programmes. However, this finding is mainly 
true for employees of African American origin and may therefore reflect racial issues in 
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large US corporations rather than gender-related issues. The availability of resources may 
also facilitate the provision of flexible workplace arrangements. In US society, women are 
still regarded as chiefly responsible for childrearing (Henrekson & Stenkula, 2009), which 
makes the availability of parental leave essential for creating equal career opportunities for 
men and women. Parental leave as well as on-site and off-site day care are traditionally 
among the most highly demanded fringe benefits by female employees (Boeker et al., 
1985) and larger companies may be at a greater liberty to support female employees 
through family accommodations, such as flexible working arrangements (e.g. teleworking 
or flexitime), organised day care, relocation support etc. (Rosen et al., 1989).  
Finally, larger companies may also be more susceptible to outside pressure regarding 
issues of corporate social responsibility. Since large companies are highly visible to the 
public and employ a relatively higher number of employees compared to their competitors, 
they may face greater external pressure to legitimise their HR practices. This may also 
results in a greater importance of equal opportunities within the firm (Goodman et al., 
2003). Therefore, I hypothesise the following:  
H1: A company’s size, measured by the number of its employees, will be positively related 
to the probability that at least one seat on the executive board is occupied by a woman. 
Hypothesis 2: Company Age 
Referring to the values of corporate culture, older firms are suspected to have greater 
structural inertia and to resist structural changes, especially in their core business (Blum et 
al., 1994). This may severely limit the career prospects of female managers if out-dated 
customs and attitudes remain unquestioned due to a lack of social innovation in the 
company. In such cases, well-established groups of elderly men on the executive board 
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may be unwilling to yield power to other social groups and effectively exclude women 
from their circles (Goodman et al., 2003). However, in the case of younger companies 
external institutional pressure to conform to contemporary values regarding gender 
equality and equal career opportunities may have been stronger at the time of foundation. 
As a result of cultural developments which occurred during the 20th century in the US, the 
existence of exclusively male-dominated executive boards may be less probable at more 
recently founded firms (Ibid.).  
Furthermore, it is theorised that young firms may be exposed to a greater risk of 
failure compared to old firms. Hence, younger firms are likely to accept competent 
executive officers regardless of their gender as they may be unable to afford the additional 
costs associated with discrimination (Thornhill & Amit, 2003). Withers et al. (2011) find 
that younger firms innovate more than their older competitors under certain circumstances, 
suggesting that younger firms tend to innovate through greater flexibility and better 
responsiveness.  
These findings indicate that younger firms may be unable to discriminate against 
female senior staff and may even gain a competitive advantage through a diverse 
workforce. The suggested adaptation of younger firms to the business environment through 
proactive structural change may also imply greater responsiveness and flexibility of 
workplace arrangements to the benefit of female executives. Therefore, I hypothesise the 
following: 
H2: A company’s age will be negatively related to the probability that at least one seat on 
the executive board is occupied by a woman.  
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Hypothesis 3: Size and Turnover of Executive Board 
Considerable evidence exists that women are frequently promoted into precarious or 
undesirable positions on the executive board (Haslam & Ryan, 2008; Haslam et al., 2010; 
Ryan & Haslam, 2005). The popular practice to employ women as executive officers 
during crises has become known as the as the glass cliff phenomenon and was extensively 
discussed in the Literature Review. Furthermore, it has been observed that financial 
difficulties, which often accompany critical periods in a company, are associated with 
higher management turnover (Gilson, 1989). This is particularly true for the executive 
board since the sensitivity of employee turnover to financial performance increases with 
higher positions in the corporate hierarchy6 (Fee & Hadlock, 2004). Hence, existing and 
potential employees may regard high turnover rates among executive officers as an 
indicator of difficulties in the company or poor firm performance. 
Consequently, high turnover rates may signal economic difficulty and influence the 
attractiveness of executive positions for potential candidates. Following the arguments of 
the glass cliff theory, male managers may feel discouraged and seek more attractive job 
opportunities while women may regard even a less attractive vacancy on the executive 
board as a chance to break through the glass ceiling. Furthermore, many US companies 
rely on the internal labour market for promoting executive officers. If turnover among 
executives is too high over a certain period, the internal pool of qualified male candidates 
may become insufficient and companies may resort to hiring women to fill vacancies 
(Goodman et al., 2003; Reskin & McBrier, 2000). Based on these findings, I hypothesise 
the following: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6  Fee & Hadlock (2004) find that chief executive officers are particularly vulnerable to negative 
developments in firm performance. Simultaneously, other executive officers are substantially more likely to 
leave the firm after the appointment of a new chief executive. 
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H3a: The turnover rate among a company’s executive board members, measured by the 
inverse of executive board members’ average tenure, will be positively related to the 
probability that at least one seat on the executive board is occupied by a woman. 
When considering the turnover of the executive board, it is also necessary to account 
for the size of the executive board relative to the size of the company. If higher turnover 
rates among executives increase the probability that at least one woman serves on the 
executive board, then larger boards should amplify this effect. This effect can be regarded 
as purely statistical and is comparable to the observation of lorry drivers on a motorway. If 
the odds of spotting at least one female driver within a predefined time frame increase with 
more lorries passing through the observation area due to higher speed limits (i.e. greater 
turnover), than a wider observation area (i.e. larger executive board) should also increase 
the odds. Therefore, assuming that executive officers’ turnover rate does actually influence 
the probability that at least one woman serves on the executive board, it is likely that the 
size of the executive board has a similar effect. However, independently from turnover 
rates, relative board size could also affect the probability that at least one seat on the 
executive board is occupied by a woman if a larger board puts additional pressure on the 
firm to comply with expectations regarding CSR, similar to the effects assumed in H1. 
Therefore, I hypothesise the following as a corollary to H3a: 
H3b: The number of executive officers in a company relative to the company’s size will be 
positively related to the probability that at least one seat on the executive board is 
occupied by a woman.  
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Hypothesis 4: Executive Compensation 
Existing research provides reason to assume that compensation levels in 
organisations and industries may be correlated with the proportion of female employees 
(Aigner & Cain, 1977; Arrow, 1973; Becker, 1971; Bergmann, 1974; Blau et al., 2010; 
Doeringer & Piore, 1971). Although the above-mentioned scholars have frequently 
observed that lower pay is associated with a higher proportion of female employees, they 
are hesitant to assume a specific causality regarding this relationship. In some cases, lower 
compensation levels could arguably constitute a result of overcrowding in certain 
industries (Bergmann, 1974). However, following Becker’s (1971) argument, lower 
compensation levels in such overcrowded jobs or industries could also be the cause of the 
high proportion of female workers in these jobs since employers would be aware of 
women’s lower bargaining power in a generally male-dominated and discriminatory 
business environment. Consequently, employers would hire female workers only for low-
paid positions. The effects regarding low compensation levels and female employment 
may also be reciprocal in nature, which could make it impossible to find a clear direction 
as in the case of the famous chicken-or-the-egg causality dilemma.  
Despite this criticism, contemporary research provides reason to believe that pay 
levels may indeed affect female executive board representation. On the one hand, 
institutionalised pay practices which put women at a disadvantage can exert pressure on 
management salaries for both genders, thus causing an overall reduction of pay levels in 
female-dominated industries (Blum et al., 1994). On the other hand, male managers are 
believed to have better outside options compared to their female colleagues (Goodman et 
al., 2003; Reskin & McBrier, 2000) so that, in consequence, women may be forced to 
accept executive positions offering lower pay compared to male executives. Hence, I 
propose the following hypothesis: 
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H4a: Average compensation levels for the members of a company’s executive board will 
be negatively related to the probability that at least one seat on the executive board is 
occupied by a woman. 
The attractiveness of a particular job is not solely defined by the current level of 
compensation but also by the expectations regarding the future career development, i.e. the 
chances of a promotion or pay rise. The competition for promotion between individuals in 
a firm can be regarded as a tournament and the financial gain from a promotion as the prize 
that is awarded to the winner of the tournament. According to tournament theory, a greater 
spread, i.e. the difference between the monetary compensation of the loser and the winner, 
may induce a greater effort supply by the contestants as the potential prize money becomes 
greater for the winner. However, assuming the existence of constraints regarding the cost 
of a tournament, a greater spread also implies greater risk for the participants as the 
amount of money forfeited by the loser increases (Lazear & Rosen, 1981).  
The question arises whether contestants’ gender influences the degree of risk 
aversion and, consequently, the inclination to participate in high-powered tournaments. 
Most scholars agree, without necessarily supporting the theory, that regarding women as 
more risk-averse than men constitutes a well established opinion within the scientific 
community (Dohmen & Falk, 2007; Iqbal et al., 2006; Maxfield et al., 2010; Paul & Sahni, 
2009).7 Although risk preferences may be biologically co-founded (Maxfield et al., 2010), 
the main determinant of gender differences is likely to be socialisation. Qualitative 
empirical research conducted among female lawyers and accountants in the US revealed 
the existence of two important causes of women’s relatively conservative choices. First, 
accepting greater professional risks also implies greater risk in one’s private life due to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 An overview of the existing theories on gender differences in risk taking behaviour is provided by Croson 
& Gneezy (2009).  
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long and irregular working hours, a high workload etc., which may conflict with women’s 
societal role as primary homemakers and caretakers in the family. In order to safeguard 
their partnership and family relations, female professionals may prefer a stable and 
predictable work environment. Second, women are more likely to end up in an 
economically precarious situation with care-dependent relatives and therefore lack the 
necessary safety net for risky career decisions (Narcisse, 2011). 
Other scholars confirm that women are more risk-averse than men with respect to 
financial decisions (e.g. Jianakoplos & Bernasek, 1998). In an experimental study, 
Dohmen & Falk (2007) found that women were less likely to self-select into variable pay 
schemes. This result cannot be fully explained by differences in productivity, indicating 
actual gender differences in risk taking behaviour. Furthermore, female chief financial 
officers were found to apply more conservative strategies in financial reporting (Peni & 
Vähämaa, 2010), a conclusion which is supported by the observation that fees for external 
audits are lower for companies with women on their internal audit boards (Ittonen et al., 
2008).  
Contrary to these findings, some researchers object to the theory of gendered risk 
preferences. Maxfield et al. (2010) criticise that contemporary research focuses on a 
strongly limited number of areas to assess risk taking behaviour, namely physical health 
and safety and financial decisions. The authors of the literature study further argue that 
leaving this limited scope of observation might reveal that no substantial differences exist 
in the case of other work-related decisions. Other researchers, such as Paul & Sahni 
(2009), also argue that the assumption of women’s higher risk aversion should be rejected 
because female executives are more likely to be present in high-risk segments of the 
economy. However, the latter finding could also be explained by other factors than self-
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selection, such as easier access for women to certain jobs which are considered less 
attractive on the labour market.  
Despite some recent contributions questioning the universal validity of the 
assumption of women’s relatively higher degree of risk aversion, evidence in support of 
this theory still dominates the gender discourse in business and economics. Hence, I 
assume that female executives will behave in a more risk-averse way than their male 
colleagues with regard to their compensation. For the purposes of this thesis, I therefore 
hypothesise the following: 
H4b: The spread in compensation levels among the members of a company’s executive 
board will be negatively related to the probability that at least one seat on the executive 
board is occupied by a woman. 
Hypothesis 5: Token-Effects 
In my analysis of the importance of public opinion and CSR I extensively discussed 
the necessity for large corporations to invest in CSR in order to create a beneficial image 
of the company regarding gender-related issues. However, such measures are sometimes 
criticised as superficial and attempting to stimulate a benevolent public opinion without 
introducing any real changes (Tench et al., 2007). In response to external pressure, some 
companies may appoint a few women to the executive board in order to legitimise their 
structures and procedures. Such isolated cases of female individuals in an almost 
exclusively male environment are also referred to as “tokens” (Chesterman & Ross-Smith, 
2006; Kanter, 1977; Stamp, 1990). 
The notion of tokens does not exclusively apply to women, but can refer to any 
minority. The defining characteristic of a token is that the minority to which the token 
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belongs is very small in the given context, which creates very high visibility of the token 
and a state of over-observation, in which every action is noticed and its outcome 
scrutinised, especially in the case of a failure or mistake. In consequence, polarisation may 
occur, which describes the highlighting of particular differences between the highly visible 
token and the majority group. Additionally, through what is referred to as assimilation, 
tokens may be pushed into a certain stereotypical role in order to conform to 
preconceptions about the minority group held by the members of the majority group 
(Kanter, 1977). For these reasons token status may severely impair women’s chances of 
further career progress as well as limit the prospects for female job candidates to become 
employed as executive officers, especially if the employer is not interested in admitting 
more women to top management than absolutely necessary to sustain the mere impression 
of equal employment opportunities.  
Furthermore, women who, against the odds, have actually been successful in senior 
corporate management might be very self-conscious about their status as tokens. 
Perceiving themselves as highly visible outsiders in a high-prestige group, female 
executives could be anxious to lose their exceptional status if other women were admitted 
to comparable positions and, therefore, prevent them from advancing. This phenomenon 
has been termed the “queen bee syndrome” and contradicts the assumption that women in 
top management positions are instrumental in supporting other women’s career 
advancement (Duguid, 2011).  
Token theory has received modest empirical support (Hewstone et al., 2006), 
however, critics draw attention to Kanter’s approach as being excessively focused on 
quantitative relations, i.e. the numerical domination of one group over another, 
disregarding factors such as social status or prestige. Yoder (1991; 1994) exemplifies that, 
contrary to the predictions of token theory, male nurses are frequently subject to positive 
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discrimination, despite working in a female-dominated profession, e.g. by being addressed 
as “Doctor” by patients. 
Although empirical contributions in support of Kanter’s token theory are more than 
scarce, theoretical findings as well as extremely low numbers of female executive officers 
in times of intense public pressure to conform to ethical standards point to the possibility 
that firms which employ female executive officers do so in order to fabricate the 
impression of equal employment opportunities. If this assumption is correct, then 
employers will likely be satisfied with a single woman serving on the executive board as a 
token and make no substantial effort to appoint additional women to the executive board. 
Consequently, I propose the following hypothesis:  
H5: The mechanisms predicted in H1 – H4 will have weaker effects on the probability that 
additional seats on the executive board will be occupied by women in a company if one 
seat on the executive board is already occupied by a woman. 
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Methods 
Sample 
For the purposes of this study, information from two separate databases was merged 
into one sample. First, data from Standard & Poor’s Compustat Fundamentals Annually 
were obtained via the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). The database contains 
financial information as well as other key indicators of US and Canadian companies. The 
information on companies was amended by data obtained from S&P’s Compustat 
Execucomp database, which contains data on executive officers from the US and Canada. 
Compustat Execucomp includes personal information on executives and compensation 
data, which is derived from obligatory filings with the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC).  
The available data cover a period of nine years from 2001 to 2009. The sample was 
selected based on the S&P 500 index, using the constituents of the last year of the 
observation period. Subsequently, data on the sample constituents were checked for 
availability and companies were excluded if data were not available for the entire 
observation period. Missing data were most frequently the result of changes in the 
composition of index constituents, which occur due to mergers as well as elimination from 
and inclusion into the index. Moreover, the S&P 500 index includes a small number of 
companies which are incorporated outside the United States. Since my analysis is intended 
to cover only US corporations, these items were also eliminated. The resulting sample was 
comprised of 418 US corporations, employing approximately 2,2008 executive officers. 
Since the information on executive officers was obtained via SEC filings, the 
definition of an executive officer follows the criteria applied by the SEC. Rule 3b-7 of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 The exact number of executive officers depends on the reporting year. 
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General Rules and Regulations promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
provides the following definition of “executive officer”: 
“The term ‘executive officer’, when used with reference to a registrant, 
means its president, any vice president of the registrant in charge of a 
principal business unit, division or function (such as sales, administration 
or finance), any other officer who performs a policy making function or 
any other person who performs similar policy making functions for the 
registrant. Executive officers of subsidiaries may be deemed executive 
officers of the registrant if they perform such policy making functions for 
the registrant.” 
In practice, executive boards of the sampled companies consist of at least three 
people, usually the president and chief executive officer (CEO), the chief financial officer 
(CFO) and the chief operating officer (COO). Usually, these executives are joined by two 
vice-presidents in charge of either key business divisions or critical functions, depending 
on the company’s organisational structure. The statistical mode regarding the number of 
executives in a company is five while the standard deviation is .96 so that, on average, the 
sample includes the four to six most senior employees of each corporation.  
Data on executives were concentrated by calculating either sums or arithmetic means 
so that they could be incorporated into the sample at a corporate level. The resulting 
sample was comprised of 418 companies observed over a period of nine years, which 
amounted to 3762 distinct items. Finally, I transformed several data categories into dummy 
variables in order to enable the examination of binary effects. Several other data categories 
were transformed to obtain their natural logarithm values. This was done to account for 
relative changes in variables containing large numbers, e.g. variables describing executive 
compensation. 
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Data Analysis 
I conducted the empirical analysis as a series of multivariate logit regressions using 
STATA 12. The dependent variables were in all cases related to the presence of female 
executive officers in the sampled corporations. Independent explanatory variables contain 
information on the sampled companies as well as condensed data on executives. Company 
size was measured by the number of employees in a company. Company age was 
measured by the year of company foundation. Executive officers’ average tenure was used 
to determine turnover rates among executives while the absolute number of executive 
board members in a company was used to measure the size of the executive board. 
Variables describing elements of executive officers’ compensation packages are defined as 
follows:  
• “Base Salary” denotes current compensation elements unrelated to executives’ 
individual or firm performance; 
• “Bonus” denotes performance-related current compensation; 
• “Total Current Compensation (TCC)” is calculated as the sum of “Salary” and 
“Bonus” and  
• “Total Deferred Compensation (TDC)” denotes TCC plus all non-current 
compensation elements (e.g. contributions to private pension plans, vested share 
options).  
The corresponding “Spread” values for each of these variables were calculated as the 
difference between the highest and the lowest value in each company and for each year. 
Model 1 of the regression analyses does not include executive compensation. Models 
2 and 3 include different measures of executive compensation since the analyses would 
suffer from strong intercorrelation between the compensation-related variables if all of 
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them were included simultaneously. Specifically, the effects of “Total Current 
Compensation” were tested separately from those of “Salary” and “Bonus” as well as the 
corresponding spreads because the former variable is systematically based on both 
“Salary” and “Bonus”. Where indicated, I used the natural logarithm of the absolute values 
of certain independent variables for the analysis in order to enable the observation of 
effects on the outcome variables which were caused by relative changes in the independent 
variables. 
Several control variables were also considered in the analysis. “Total Assets” and 
“Revenues” are additional categories related to firm size. “Year” dummies for each 
reporting year were included to control for effects related to the economic cycle. Binary 
control variables were introduced, assigning the location of corporate headquarters to one 
of the four major geographic regions of the United States, namely the Northeast, Midwest, 
South or West. The “Region” dummies allowed to control for effects related to regional 
disparities regarding the compensation of female employees (Williams & Register, 1986) 
as well as differences in state legislation and the size of certain branches of the economy in 
which the fraction of female employees is disproportionately high, such as healthcare or 
education (Ryu, 2010). Furthermore, differences in population density could be observed, 
which are believed to influence the availability of organised child care in the US. 
Specifically, day care centres, which are likely to increase the probability of women to 
engage in paid employment, may be available to a greater number of inhabitants in densely 
populated areas of the United States (Gordon & Chase-Lansdale, 2001). Finally, dummy 
variables for economic sectors, i.e. manufacturing, non-manufacturing, healthcare, high 
technology and utility, were created in order to control for differences in the gender 
composition between these sectors (Blau et al., 2010).  
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In the first stage of the analysis, the entire sample of 418 companies was analysed. 
The dependent variable was defined as the presence of at least one woman on the 
company’s executive board. As part of the test of Hypothesis 5, I tested whether the 
appointment of one woman to the executive board is influential for the successive 
appointment of a second female executive. In order to examine possible selection effects, I 
employed a biprobit regression function for seemingly unrelated binary variables. The 
presence of exactly two women on a company’s executive board was defined as the 
dependent variable, contingent upon the selection criterion, which was defined as the 
presence of one woman on the executive board. I introduced “Net Income Margin” as a 
necessary additional independent variable in the second stage of the biprobit regression 
function.  
In the second stage of the analysis, which constituted a further test of H5, I reduced 
the original sample of 418 corporations to 132 companies which employed at least one 
female executive board member during at least one reporting year of the observation 
period. I repeated the regression analysis from the first stage, using almost identical model 
specifications. However, the dependent variable was now defined as the presence of more 
than one woman on a company’s executive board. Furthermore, I introduced additional 
dummy variables for certain executive positions held by women in order to control for 
possible effects related to the degree of responsibility and importance for financial success. 
The decision which executive functions to include was made on the basis of studies 
conducted by Burress & Zucca (2004) and Elkinawy & Stater (2011) as well as pre-tests of 
the sample. Chief executive officers, chief financial officers and chief operating officers 
were regarded as pivotal for overall success while chief communicating officers and 
general counsels might shoulder fewer responsibilities and be more easily replaceable. 
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Finally, the statistical models were subjected to diagnostics in order to determine their 
goodness of fit, including tests for sensitivity and specificity.  
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Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
 The full sample consists of 418 US corporations listed in the S&P 500 index. Most 
of these companies could be assigned to either one of the two main economic sectors, 
manufacturing or services. The healthcare, high technology and utility sectors were treated 
as separate parts of the economy because they include aspects of both industrial 
manufacturing and provision of services. For example, a software firm may develop, 
produce and distribute their products (manufacturing), but also provide customer support, 
updates and gather feedback on the use of their products (services). A clear assignment to 
either manufacturing or services was therefore impossible and impractical in some cases.  
 Table 1  
 Number of Companies by Economic Sector and Location 
  Economic Sector 
Sum 
  Manufacturing Non-manufacturing Healthcare 
High 
Technology Utility 
Location of 
Headquarters 
Northeast 37 40 15 15 5 112 
Midwest 42 39 10 4 10 105 
South 55 38 4 8 17 122 
West 20 17 7 31 4 79 
Sum 154 134 36 58 36 418 
Note. Economic sectors are based on the classification applied in S&P Compustat 
databases. The location of headquarters is based on the official grouping of states 
employed by the U.S. Census Bureau9. Regions include the following states: Northeast: 
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont; Midwest: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, 
Wisconsin; South: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia; West: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, Wyoming. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 See also https://www.census.gov/geo/www/geo_defn.html#AttachmentC 
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Table 1 summarises the industrial and regional structure of the sample. 
Manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms are quite evenly distributed across all regions, 
considering that the West generally hosts fewer large companies. However, the South still 
plays a dominant role in manufacturing. In contrast to this, private healthcare firms are 
centred in the Northeast region. Unsurprisingly, the West is dominated by high technology 
firms, many of which are located in the famous IT cluster of Silicon Valley in Northern 
California. However, a considerable number of corporations operating in the field of high 
technology can also be found in the Northeast of the US, creating a counterbalance to 
Silicon Valley. Finally, the utility sector is concentrated in the South, which is a result of 
the high concentration of fossil resources in the southern parts of the country.  
Companies vary strongly in size, depending on the economic sector (see Figure 1). 
Based on the number of employees, the sampled non-manufacturing companies are on 
average 43 per cent larger than the average company in the sample. In contrast to this, the 
average healthcare or high-tech company is approximately 44 per cent smaller than the 
average manufacturing and 59 per cent smaller than the average non-manufacturing 
corporation. Utility firms are the smallest in the sample, employing only 11,500 workers 
on average. The differences in company size by region are not as stark as those by 
economic sector (see Figure 2). However, companies with headquarters located in the 
West are on average 37 per cent smaller than the average company in the sample. This 
result is not surprising as the West is strongly dominated by high technology firms, which 
employ relatively fewer workers compared to the average sampled firm (see also Table 1 
and Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Number of employees by economic sector. 
Note. Based on year 2001. Numbers denote units of 1,000. Labels represent arithmetic 
mean values of the number of companies’ employees for each economic sector. 
“Average” equals to the arithmetic mean of the number of all sampled companies’ 
employees across all economic sectors. Economic sectors are based on the classification 
applied in S&P Compustat databases. 
Figure 2. Number of employees by region of the United States. 
Note. Based on year 2001. Numbers denote units of 1,000. Labels represent arithmetic 
mean values of the number of companies’ employees for each region of the US. 
“Average” equals to the arithmetic mean of the number of all sampled companies’ 
employees across all regions. The assignment to regions is based on companies’ locations 
of headquarters and on the official grouping of states employed by the U.S. Census 
Bureau. 
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The oldest firm in the sample, State Street Corporation, was founded in 1792 as 
Union Bank and financed maritime trade at that time (Fundinguniverse, n.d.). However, 
most of the 418 sampled US corporations were founded during the 20th century. The time 
bar in Figure 3 shows the median years of foundation by economic sector and location of 
headquarters. Currently active manufacturing and utility firms were typically founded 
during the later years of industrialisation, i.e. the late 19th and early 20th century. Non-
manufacturing and healthcare firms were often founded after World War II, when services 
began to increasingly dominate the US economy. Finally, contemporary high-tech 
corporations began to emerge in the 1970s when rapid developments in computer 
technology enabled the realisation of new visions. A look at the regional differences 
regarding the years of company foundation reveals that corporations in the Midwest and 
Northeast are on average older than those which have their headquarters located in the 
South and West of the USA. This mirrors the historical development of the US, which was 
colonised by Europeans, who initially settled along the coast of the Atlantic and gradually 
advanced from the northern and eastern regions to the rest of the continent. This resulted in 
regional disparities which still persist. Furthermore, the relatively young age of companies 
located in the West reflects the high proportion of high technology firms in this region (see 
Table 1).  
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Figure 3. Year of company foundation. 
Note. Labels denote median values of years of company foundations by economic sector 
above the time bar and by region of the US (based on the location of corporate 
headquarters) below the time bar. Economic sectors are based on the classification applied 
in S&P Compustat databases. The location of headquarters is based on the official 
grouping of states employed by the U.S. Census Bureau. “Total median” denotes the 
median year of company foundation across the entire sample. 
As outlined in the introduction to this thesis, the fraction of women among company 
executives in the US is still low. Therefore, it should be no surprise that this statement is 
also true for the sample of companies used in this study. In 2001, 165 of the approximately 
2,200 executive officers featured in the sample were women, accounting for 6.1 per cent of 
all executive board members. The number of female executives declined somewhat in 
2005 before soaring again and reaching a peak in 2007. However, between 2007 and the 
end of the observation period in 2009 the number of female executives plummeted, 
declining by almost one fourth. Interestingly, the development shown in Figure 4 lends 
support to the glass cliff theory, which was extensively discussed in the Literature Review. 
The increase in appointments of women to executive boards until 2007 coincides with the 
peak of the US housing bubble, which was already apparent at that time and might have 
prompted companies to brace themselves for turbulent times. Only a few years later, when 
the US economy faced its strongest downturn, many companies were forced to restructure 
their activities and, apparently, many female executive board members were replaced by 
male successors. Greater precariousness and difficulty of female executives’ positions 
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could have been causal for the decline towards the end of the observation period. Although 
the glass cliff phenomenon constitutes a plausible explanation for the observed fluctuations 
in female executive board representation, it is too early to accept the theory at this stage of 
the analysis. 
Figure 4. Number of female executive officers. 
Note. Chart shows the changes in the absolute number of female executive officers during 
the observation period. The x-axis denotes the years of observation. The y-axis denotes 
the absolute number of female executives in the entire sample. 
The development regarding the number of female chief executive officers is slightly 
more optimistic as the fraction of women among CEOs has been constantly increasing 
throughout the observation period (see Figure 5). However, the increase occurs at a very 
low level since only five out of the 418 sampled companies had a female CEO in 2001. 
Although this figure has more than doubled until 2009, women still account for less than 
three per cent of all CEOs. Finally, Figure 6 shows the fraction of companies employing at 
least one female executive officers during the observation period. Since few corporations 
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employ more than one female executive at a time, the chart mirrors the development 
presented in Figure 4, showing a temporary increase during the years from 2006 to 2008. 
Generally, the fraction of companies employing women as executive officers fluctuates 
around thirty per cent, which means that approximately two thirds of the companies 
featured in this sample are characterised by male-only executive boards.  
Figure 5. Number of female chief executive officers. 
Note. Chart shows the changes in the absolute number of female chief executive officers 
during the observation period. The x-axis denotes the years of observation. The y-axis 
denotes the absolute number of female CEOs in the entire sample. 
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Figure 6. Fraction of companies employing female executive officers. 
Note. Chart shows the changes in the fraction of companies which employed at least one 
female executive officer during the observation period. The x-axis denotes the years of 
observation. The y-axis denotes the percentage of all sampled companies which employed 
one or more female executive officers during the reported years. 
Before proceeding to the results of the regression analyses, I shall discuss some 
noteworthy correlations between certain variables used in the analyses. The response 
variable is mildly negatively correlated with executives’ tenure and mildly positively 
correlated with the size of the executive board, which matches the assumptions made in 
Hypothesis 3. Variables related to company size, such as the number of employees, the 
number of executives, the total value of assets and revenues, exhibit a clear tendency to 
correlate positively with measures of executive compensation. This is not surprising since 
existing research has found executive compensation to increase with company size 
(Agarwal, 1981). Executives’ average tenure is positively correlated with measures of 
company size and executive compensation, indicating that executives might remain longer 
at larger companies and in better-paid jobs. However, the direction of the effect, i.e. the 
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question whether the observed differences in turnover are caused by voluntary or 
involuntary terminations of work contracts, remains unclear. Interestingly, company age is 
negatively correlated with some measures of executive compensation and the total value of 
assets in the company. The correlation coefficients are small but suggest that, first, 
younger firms have acquired fewer assets compared to their elder competitors and, second, 
younger firms may be unwilling or unable to offer the same level of compensation to their 
executive officers as larger firms.  
Variables relating to executive compensation are significantly intercorrelated. This 
result is highly plausible since several of the measures used in the analysis are 
conceptually based on one another. For example, total current compensation is calculated 
as the sum of base salary and bonus. Hence, it is not surprising that TCC is almost 
perfectly correlated with the value of the bonus. Furthermore, compensation elements are 
likely to be determined on the basis of firm and individual characteristics as entire 
“compensation packages” rather than to be set independently from each other. Similarly, 
variables describing absolute levels of compensation are strongly correlated with the 
corresponding spreads, which indicates that the intensity of tournament-based incentives 
increases with rising absolute levels of compensation. 
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Table 2 
Mean, Standard Deviation and Pairwise Correlations of Selected Variables 
                  
Mean Standard Deviation 
Presence of 
Female 
Executives 
Number of 
Employees 
Year of 
Foundation 
Executives' 
Average Tenure 
Number of 
Executives Base Salary Bonus 
Total Current 
Compensation 
(TCC) 
Total Deferred 
Compensation 
(TDC) 
Salary Spread Bonus Spread TCC Spread TDC Spread Total Assets Revenues 
Presence of Female Executives .31  .46  1 
 
Number of Employees 48.93  108.66  .0017 1 
 
Year of Foundation 1937.77  48.22  -.0732 *** -.0117 1 
 
Executives' Average Tenure 4,843.15  3,873.59  -.1128 *** .1272 *** -.0975 *** 1 
 
Number of Executives 6.02  1.24  .1394 *** .0145 .0162 -.0236 1 
 
Base Salary 572.96  232.26  .0242 .2970 *** -.1116 *** .2488 *** -.1519 *** 1 
 
Bonus 543.55  1,127.39  .0326 * .1086 *** -.0482 ** .0230 .0184 .2197 *** 1 
 
Total Current Compensation (TCC) 1,116.52  1,199.99  .0353 * .1594 *** -.0668 *** .0783 *** -.0121 .3999 *** .9820 *** 1 
 
Total Deferred Compensation (TDC) 4,702.33  7,325.32  .0422 ** .1163 *** .0416 * .1018 *** -.0599 *** .2437 *** .2571 *** .2888 *** 1 
 
Salary Spread 653.98  375.38  .0608 *** .1728 *** -.0953 *** .1356 *** .1367 *** .6812 *** .1407 *** .2641 *** .1529 *** 1 
 
Bonus Spread 1,089.27  2,828.96  .0491 ** .0804 *** -.0166 .0031 .1046 *** .1589 *** .7356 *** .7219 *** .2222 *** .1818 *** 1 
 
TCC Spread 1,653.85  2,882.77  .0545 *** .0943 *** -.0260 .0217 .1120 *** .2286 *** .7285 *** .7287 *** .2321 *** .2885 *** .9909 *** 1 
 
TDC Spread 11,232.47  31,138.81  .0461 ** .0516 ** .0592 *** .0624 *** .0172 .1080 *** .0917 *** .1071 *** .9298 *** .1033 *** .1312 *** .1397 *** 1 
 
Total Assets 43,858.95  153,249.40  .0636 *** .2289 *** -.1181 *** .0545 ** .0498 ** .2073 *** .4461 *** .4592 *** .1795 *** .1099 *** .2398 *** .2367 *** .0506 ** 1 
 
Revenues 16,373.96  31,029.70  .0141 .6782 *** -.0142 .2030 *** .0402 * .4085 *** .2198 *** .2856 *** .2039 *** .3083 *** .1484 *** .1763 *** .0871 *** .4364 *** 1 
 
Net Income Margin 5.84  52.71  -.0212 -.0050 -.0419 * .0452 * -.0712 *** .0392 * -.1282 *** -.1129 *** -.0213 .0098 -.3628 *** -.3529 *** -.0250 -.0218 .0052 
 
                     
Note. Data is presented at corporate level.  
Variables relating to executive compensation measured in units of 1,000USD, “Total Assets” and “Revenues” in units of 1,000,000USD.  
“Number of Employees” measured in units of 1,000. “Year of Foundation” measured in years. “Executives’ Average Tenure” measured in days. 
n = 3762. Number of observations varies for some key variables due to missing observations. 
Levels of significance are shown as *** for p < .001, ** for p < .01 and * for p < .05. 
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Regression Analyses 
Table 3  
Summary of Results of Full Sample Multivariate Logit Regression 
     
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
pseudo R2 .052 .064 .054 .064 
probability > !2 0 0 0 0 
dependent variable: at least one seat on executive board occupied by a woman 
Number of Employees† .014  .001  .015  .001   
(.011) 
 
(.013) 
 
(.011) 
 
(.013)   
          
Year of Foundation 
-.001 *** -.001 *** -.001 *** -.001 *** 
(.000) 
 
(.000) 
 
(.000) 
 
(.000)   
           Executives' Average 
Tenure† 
-.058 *** -.052 *** -.058 *** -.053 *** 
(.009) 
 
(.010) 
 
(.009) 
 
(.010)   
           
Number of Executives 
.052 *** .051 *** .053 *** .050 *** 
(.007) 
 
(.008) 
 
(.008) 
 
(.009)   
           
Base Salary† .  -.003  .  .020   . 
 
(.024) 
 
. 
 
(.041)   
           
Bonus† .  -.009  .  -.005   . 
 
(.009) 
 
. 
 
(.010)   
           
Salary Spread† .  .049 * .  .045   . 
 
(.023) 
 
. 
 
(.029)   
           
Bonus Spread† .  .009  .  .013   . 
 
(.012) 
 
. 
 
(.018)   
           Total Current 
Compensation (TCC)† 
. 
 
. 
 
-.032 
 
-.030   
. 
 
. 
 
(.024) 
 
(.047)   
           Total Deferred 
Compensation (TDC)† 
. 
 
. 
 
.036 * -.001   
. 
 
. 
 
(.018) 
 
(.024)   
           
TCC Spread† .  .  .033 * -.001   . 
 
. 
 
(.016) 
 
(.032)   
           
TDC Spread† .  .  -.008  .004   . 
 
. 
 
(.012) 
 
(.015)   
           
Total Assets† -.022 * -.030 * -.027 ** -.029 * 
(.010) 
 
(.012) 
 
(.010) 
 
(.012)   
           
Revenues† .020  .035  .015  .035   
(.016) 
 
(.019) 
 
(.016) 
 
(.019)   
           
Region Midwest 
-.115 *** -.120 *** -.109 *** -.121 *** 
(.025) 
 
(.030) 
 
(.025) 
 
(.030)   
           
Region South 
.034 
 
.067 * .038 
 
.067 * 
(.023) 
 
(.027) 
 
(.024) 
 
(.027)   
           
Region West 
.050 
 
.081 ** .052 * .080 ** 
(.026) 
 
(.030) 
 
(.026) 
 
(.030)   
           Sector  
Non-manufacturing 
.086 *** .099 *** .094 *** .100 *** 
(.021) 
 
(.026) 
 
(.022) 
 
(.026)   
           
Sector Health 
.145 *** .144 *** .143 *** .143 *** 
(.031) 
 
(.037) 
 
(.031) 
 
(.037)   
           
Sector High-tech 
.040 
 
.054 
 
.044 
 
.053   
(.029) 
 
(.034) 
 
(.030) 
 
(.034)   
           
Sector Utility 
.011 
 
.041 
 
.021 
 
.040   
(.037)   (.043)   (.037)   (.043)   
         
Note. Table shows the marginal effects on the binary dependent variable. Standard errors are 
shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is the presence of at least one woman on a 
company’s executive board during the given reporting year.  
† indicates that the natural logarithm of the absolute value was used for the analysis. 
Variables relating to executive compensation measured in units of 1,000USD, “Total Assets” and 
“Revenues” in units of 1,000,000USD. “Number of Employees” measured in units of 1,000. “Year 
of Foundation” measured in years. “Executives’ Average Tenure” measured in days. Reference 
year for “Year” dummy (not reported) is 2005. Reference category for “Region” dummy is 
“Northeast”. Reference category for “Sector” dummy is “Manufacturing”. 
n = 3762. Number of observations varies for some key variables due to missing observations. 
Levels of significance are shown as *** for p < .001, ** for p < .01 and * for p < .05. 
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Table 3 shows the results of the multivariate logit regression using the full sample of 
418 companies over a period of nine years. Contrary to the assumption made in H1, the 
number of employees has no significant effect on the presence of female executives in a 
company. Furthermore, the control variable “Total Assets” indicates that a one per cent 
increase in a firm’s asset value lowers the probability that a woman occupies a seat on the 
executive board by approximately three per cent. Interestingly, the effect of company age 
is highly significant but extremely weak as it almost equals to zero. Hence, the data do not 
support H2. Regarding H3, the highly significant effects relating to the composition of the 
executive board fully support both assumptions. As predicted, one additional executive 
board member increases the odds that this individual will be a woman by approximately 
five per cent while, simultaneously, a one per cent increase in average tenure lowers the 
odds to a similar degree. Variables relating to executive compensation are not highly 
significant. However, the total compensation including deferred elements has a positive 
impact on female executive board representation. Likewise, the somewhat correlated  
(r = .29) variables “Salary Spread” and “TCC Spread” positively affect the probability of at 
least one woman serves on a company’s executive board. Both results contradict the 
assumption made in H4. In summary, the results support Hypothesis 3 while Hypotheses 1, 
2 and 4 are rejected at this stage of the analysis. Hypothesis 5 is yet to be tested.  
The effects of the remaining control variables are generally unsurprising and 
plausible. None of the year dummies 2001 to 2009 has a significant impact on the response 
variable and the results are therefore omitted from Table 3 and Table 4. Furthermore, 
companies with their headquarters located in the comparatively rural areas of the Midwest 
are less likely to employ female executives compared to those located in the Northeast. 
Conversely, companies in the West are more likely to employ women as executive officers 
compared to those in the Northeast. Female executives are also more likely to be found in 
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non-manufacturing and healthcare than in manufacturing. The latter result partly confirms 
earlier findings on the role of industry type regarding female executive board 
representation (Blum et al., 1994). A test of the goodness of fit reveals that the model 
suffers from a somewhat low sensitivity (19% for Model 4). The specificity is high (92.7% 
for the Model 4) due the large number of companies without any women on their executive 
boards. However, the quality of prediction is good in a probability interval of [.2 ; .6], 
where the majority of the observed values lie (see Appendix A). Based on these results, I 
conclude that the statistical model is adequately specified for the purposes of this study.  
In order to deepen the understanding of the observed effects, particularly those 
relating to Hypothesis 5, it was necessary to conduct additional analyses of the sample. 
Since H5 assumes that the presence of one woman on a firm’s executive board has a direct 
effect on the probability that a second woman is appointed to the executive board, I 
decided to conduct a biprobit regression for seemingly unrelated binary variables in order 
to verify the existence of such a selection effect. The test did not confirm the assumption as 
the highly non-significant selection criterion (p = 1.0) revealed that the presence of one 
female executive has no direct effect on the probability that an additional second female 
executive will be employed. This result refutes one of the central assumptions formulated 
in Hypothesis 5 according to which the presence of a single woman on a company’s 
executive board would be detrimental to the employment opportunities of additional 
female candidates for executive board seats at this particular company. 
However, the rejection of a direct selection effect is insufficient for the purposes of 
H5, which requires a closer examination of possible changes in the effects predicted by H1 
– H4. Table 4 shows the results of the multivariate logit regression using the reduced 
sample of 132 companies which employed at least one female executive officer during at 
least one reporting year. The observed effects were the same as in the full sample analysis. 
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The only material difference to the former analysis is that the response variable is defined 
as the presence of more than one female executive in a company. 
The most notable change from the results of the full sample analysis is that the 
number of employees gains a significant positive effect on female executive board 
representation, as predicted by H1. Simultaneously, the control variable “Revenues” gains 
a negative effect on the outcome variable, similar to the effect of “Total Assets” in the full 
sample regressions, which has now become non-significant. Furthermore, the effect of 
company age has become equal to zero. Regarding the assumptions of H3, the effect of 
executive board size has remained stable, however, the effect of executives’ tenure has 
vanished. The effects of executive compensation suggest that absolute compensation levels 
have a positive effect on the outcome variable. Specifically, TCC has a positive effect, as 
does the marginally non-significant (p = .059) “Base Salary” variable. Conversely, the 
spread in total current compensation affects the response variable negatively. 
Contrary to the assumption formulated in H5, the changes in the effects do not 
follow a single direction. Firm size becomes positively associated with the response 
variable so that, contrary to the full sample analysis, the results support H1. The effect of 
company age remains negligible and lends no support to H2. As predicted in H5, the effect 
of executives’ tenure disappears, resulting in a rejection of H3a at this stage of the analysis, 
however, the effect of board size remains stable, supporting H3b. The results regarding 
measures of compensation changed, but the observed effects cannot be described as either 
weaker or stronger compared to the former analysis. In summary, the results regarding 
strength and direction of the changes in the observed effects do not support H5.  
The additionally introduced control dummies for the functions of female executive 
officers revealed that women in all critical functions have a positive influence on the 
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appointment of additional female executives. However, the values of the marginal effects 
should be regarded with great caution as the observed effects are partly reciprocal due to 
the cross-sectional design of the sample. In contrast to a time series, a female CFO, who 
may have a positive effect on the dichotomous outcome variable, is also inevitably 
included in it for being classified as a female executive officer. Therefore, I expect that the 
marginal values would be considerably smaller in a time series analysis. Nevertheless, 
considering that the sample includes only a very small number of female CEOs (see Figure 
5), the comparatively strong effect of the “Female CEO” dummy reveals that female chief 
executives have a positive impact on the overall presence of female executives. As 
previously mentioned, the effect can be bidirectional since a female CEO may be 
instrumental in facilitating equal employment opportunities for subordinate female 
executives, but female executives below the CEO may likewise catalyse the appointment 
of a woman as chief executive, who would then be included in both the outcome variable 
and the independent control variable. However, either of the two possible explanations 
conflicts with the assumption of the queen bee syndrome made in Hypothesis 5.  
A comparison of model 1a and 1b reveals that the introduction of the control 
dummies indicating the functions of female executives increases both significance and 
strength of some of the observed effects of the explanatory variables. The effects of the 
remaining control variables remain largely unchanged. Year dummies (not reported) still 
have no substantial impact and effects regarding regions and economic sectors have mostly 
disappeared, with the exception of the “Non-manufacturing” sector dummy. Furthermore, 
sample diagnostics show a higher sensitivity (31.3% for Model 4) compared to the full 
sample analysis as well as a considerably better quality of prediction in a probability 
interval of [0 ; .6], where the majority of observed values lie (see Appendix B). In 
summary, the obtained results indicate that the statistical model was slightly better 
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specified for the reduced sample than for the full sample, partly due to the additional 
control dummies introduced in model 1b. 
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Table 4 
Summary of Results of Reduced Sample Multivariate Logit Regression 
      
  Model 1a Model 1b Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
pseudo R2 .066 .185 .228 .195 .232 
probability > !2 0 0 0 0 0 
dependent variable: more than one seat on executive board occupied by a woman 
Number of Employees† .061 ** .074 *** .055 ** .071 *** .054 * (.019) 
 
(.018) , (.021) 
 
(.018) 
 
(.021)  
         
Year of Foundation 
.000 
 
.000 
 
.000 
 
.000 
 
.000   
(.000) 
 
(.000) 
 
(.000) 
 
(.000) 
 
(.000)  
         
Executives' Average Tenure† -.010  -.006  -.003  -.012  -.003   
(.013) 
 
(.012) 
 
(.013) 
 
(.012) 
 
(.013)  
         
Number of Executives 
.024 * .036 *** .049 *** .046 *** .047 *** 
(.010) 
 
(.009) 
 
(.010) 
 
(.010) 
 
(.011)  
         
Base Salary† .  .  .074  .  .046   .  .  (.038)  .  (.050)  
            
Bonus† .  .  -.014  .  -.021   .  .  (.011)  .  (.014)  
            
Salary Spread† .  .  -.046  .  -.030   . 
 
. 
 
(.032) 
 
. 
 
(.039)  
            
Bonus Spread† .  .  .009  .  .023   . 
 
. 
 
(.016) 
 
. 
 
(.024)  
           Total Current Compensation 
(TCC)† 
. 
 
. 
 
. 
 
.093 * .075   
. 
 
. 
 
. 
 
(.040) 
 
(.066)  
            Total Deferred Compensation 
(TDC)† 
. 
 
. 
 
. 
 
-.006 
 
-.032   
. 
 
. 
 
. 
 
(.024) 
 
(.031)  
            
TCC Spread† .  .  .  -.062 ** -.039   . 
 
. 
 
. 
 
(.023) 
 
(.042)  
            
TDC Spread† .  .  .  .002  .005   .  .  .  (.015)  (.017)  
          
Female CEO 
. 
 
.370 *** .377 *** .363 *** .380 *** 
. 
 
(.041) 
 
(.050) 
 
(.041) 
 
(.050)  
          
Female CFO 
. 
 
.104 *** .116 *** .102 *** .110 *** 
. 
 
(.029) 
 
(.032) 
 
(.029) 
 
(.033)  
          
Female COO .  .133 ** .166 ** .139 ** .172 *** . 
 
(.048) 
 
(.053) 
 
(.048) 
 
(.053)  
          
Female CCO 
. 
 
.192 * .232 * .194 * .232 * 
. 
 
(.079) 
 
(.103) 
 
(.080) 
 
(.102)  
          
Female General Counsel 
. 
 
.177 *** .171 *** .182 *** .173 *** 
.  (.033)  (.039)  (.033)  (.040)  
         
Total Assets† -.012  -.005  -.013  -.008  -.012   (.015) 
 
(.014) 
 
(.017) 
 
(.015) 
 
(.018)  
         
Revenues† -.069 ** -.082 *** -.074 * -.080 ** -.073 * (.028) 
 
(.027) 
 
(.031) 
 
(.027) 
 
(.031)  
         
Region Midwest -.087 * -.068  -.017  -.067  -.022   
(.041) 
 
(.038) 
 
(.044) 
 
(.038) 
 
(.044)  
         
Region South 
-.056 
 
-.030 
 
-.018 
 
-.029 
 
-.023   
(.034) 
 
(.033) 
 
(.039) 
 
(.034) 
 
(.039)  
         
Region West 
.023 
 
.054 
 
.042 
 
.055 
 
.041   
(.036)  (.034)  (.040)  (.034)  (.040)  
         Sector  
Non-Manufacturing 
.109 *** .163 *** .146 *** .153 *** .143 *** 
(.033)  (.032)  (.036)  (.032)  (.036)  
         
Sector Health 
-.046 
 
.056 
 
.037 
 
.057 
 
.039   
(.052) 
 
(.049) 
 
(.056) 
 
(.049) 
 
(.056)  
         
Sector High-tech .000  .014  -.030  .018  -.027   
(.047) 
 
(.046) 
 
(.054) 
 
(.046) 
 
(.054)  
         
Sector Utility .059  .129 * .104  .133 * .103   
(.063)  (.058)  (.065)  (.059)  (.066)  
      
Note. Table shows the marginal effects on the binary dependent variable. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The 
dependent variable is the presence of more than one woman on a company’s executive board during the given reporting 
year.  
† indicates that the natural logarithm of the absolute value was used for the analysis. 
Variables relating to executive compensation measured in units of 1,000USD, “Total Assets” and “Revenues” in units of 
1,000,000USD. “Number of Employees” measured in units of 1,000. “Year of Foundation” measured in years. “Executives’ 
Average Tenure” measured in days. CEO = chief executive officer, CFO = chief financial officer, COO = chief operating 
officer, CCO = chief communications officer. Reference year for “Year” dummy (not reported) is 2005. Reference category 
for “Region” dummy is “Northeast”. Reference category for “Sector” dummy is “Manufacturing”. Reference category for 
“Female” dummy is “Other Executive”. 
n = 1188. Number of observations varies for some key variables due to missing observations. 
Levels of significance are shown as *** for p < .001, ** for p < .01 and * for p < .05. 
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Discussion of Results 
Support for H1 is limited to the set of companies which already employ at least one 
female executive and where the size of the workforce is used as a proxy to determine the 
probability that additional women will be promoted to the executive board. This result is 
quite astonishing since it implies the existence of two kinds of corporations: one type of 
companies which readily employ women as executive officers and a second type of 
companies which do not employ female executives. For the former type, the hypothesised 
size effect matters as internal HR development capacities appear to increase with a greater 
number of workers. However, for the latter type, which constitutes the majority of the 
sampled corporations, establishment size is irrelevant as willingness and desire to open top 
management positions to women are likely to be missing.  
The effect of company age is extremely weak in the full sample analysis, indicating a 
less than 0.2 per cent average decrease in the probability that a woman occupies a seat on 
the executive board for a one-year decrease in company age. Not surprisingly, the effect 
disappears completely in the reduced sample analysis. Interestingly, earlier attempts to 
establish a causal relationship between firm age and female representation in top 
management also failed (Blum et al., 1994; Goodman et al., 2003). A possible reason for 
this is that most companies evolve organically. Large corporations frequently come into 
existence as the result of mergers between smaller companies, which subsequently acquire 
other rivals. During these stages of growth major restructurings can occur which include 
changes in company names. On the other hand, corporations may also outsource parts of 
their businesses or split into smaller, however still significant, firms. This incremental 
development periodically introduces new elements to the corporate culture so that it is 
improbable that any major company would succeed in conserving the cultural values from 
the time of its foundation. Furthermore, the organic growth makes it occasionally difficult 
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to determine the precise date of a company’s foundation if it experienced a series of 
smaller acquisitions, restructurings and outsourcings. 
The differences in effects between the full sample and the reduced sample analysis 
further corroborate the conclusion that gender discrimination exists in a substantial fraction 
of US corporations. In the majority of firms, women have significantly better chances of 
employment as executive officers if turnover rates among executive board members are 
high. This finding supports the assumption that female leaders are preferentially employed 
during crises or when the internal pool of qualified male candidates is depleted due to 
extended periods of high turnover among executive officers. The crisis theory is further 
supported by the observation that women were indeed appointed as executive officers in 
greater numbers at the peak of the subprime mortgage crisis, i.e. just before the beginning 
of the global financial crisis in 2007 (see Figure 4). Therefore, the lack of support for H3a 
in the case of companies which employ at least one female executive is likely to be the 
result of equal employment opportunities and a lower degree of gender-based 
discrimination in these companies. Apparently, only a fraction of corporations employ 
executives of both genders irrespective of the precariousness of the vacant positions. A 
further interpretation may be that the non-discriminating employers hire female successors 
to fill vacant positions in top management even if turnover rates are low enough so that, 
theoretically, the pool of male candidates would be sufficient.  
Furthermore, the strong support for H3b in both samples reveals that the impact of 
the size of the executive board is not a purely statistical effect. Since the turnover rate 
among executives has no influence on the dependent variable in the reduced sample, 
increasing the observation area should be of no consequence to the outcome variable. 
Therefore, the effect of board size is likely to reflect external pressure to comply with 
expectations regarding corporate social responsibility and gender equality. This pressure 
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increases with a larger executive board so that H3b is likely to capture a size-related effect, 
similar to the one predicted by H1. 
The results of the full sample analysis do not support either assumption made in H4. 
In fact, they point to the exact opposite of the hypothesised effects, indicating that higher 
absolute compensation levels as well as larger spreads increase the probability that women 
are appointed as executive officers. However, none of the effects is highly significant. 
Furthermore, it is questionable whether the results signify gender differences in 
preferences regarding executive compensation since discrimination against women 
aspiring top management positions is very likely, as revealed in the discussion of H1 and 
H3. Contrastingly, the reduced sample excludes many discriminatory employers and may 
present a more realistic picture regarding compensation issues. Although the results 
obtained from the analysis of the reduced sample may not be generalisable to the entirety 
of corporate America, they point to a greater risk aversion of female executives compared 
to the male majority group, consistent with H4b. The results further indicate that female 
executives prefer higher absolute levels of compensation, in particular a higher base salary, 
in exchange for a lower spread in total current compensation. This implies that female 
executives may exhibit risk aversion by avoiding tournaments and preferring higher levels 
of performance insensitive, and therefore risk-free, compensation elements.  
The overall lack of support for H4 might also be explained by job candidates’ 
evaluation regarding the desirability of particular executive positions. Since compensation 
packages for executive officers depend on individual negotiation abilities and are defined 
by a wide range of candidates’ professional skills rather than collective agreements, 
prospective executives may not be able to predict their individual compensation based on 
incumbent executive officers’ remuneration in a given firm. Therefore, candidates for seats 
on the executive board might consider other easily accessible information denoting 
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employers’ ability to pay as a proxy for their expected income (Agarwal, 1981). The 
results indicate that the value of total company assets and revenues, two indicators of a 
firm’s financial strength, are negatively associated with female board representation. Total 
assets and revenues are also persistently positively correlated with measures of executive 
compensation and might hence be regarded as proxies for executive officers’ pay (see 
Table 2). In consequence, companies with more assets and higher revenues might be 
perceived as more attractive employers and, therefore, be able to attract qualified male 
candidates more easily. However, this explanation for the empirical results which were 
obtained in connection with H4 is purely speculative and requires further examination in 
future research.  
The token theory was rejected on several stages of the analysis. First and foremost, 
no selection effect was found, which could have indicated that the employment of a single 
female executive officer is causally related to the employment of additional female 
executives. This finding rejects the fundamental assumption underlying H5, according to 
which women are promoted into top management positions in single cases in order to 
maintain a false image of equal employment opportunities. Furthermore, magnitude and 
direction of the changes in the observed effects between the full and the reduced sample 
are incompatible with the predictions of H5. Tenure was the only effect which became 
clearly weaker in the reduced sample. However, as previously discussed, no indication 
exists that this change reflects tokenism, especially, since the corollary effect regarding 
board size remains stable throughout both regression analyses. Finally, the comparatively 
strong positive effect that female CEOs have on the overall probability that additional 
female executives are employed further corroborates the rejection of H5 by negating the 
existence of a queen bee syndrome. 
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General Discussion 
Gender Discrimination in the Labour Market 
The findings of this study give reason to believe that gender-based discrimination, 
which puts women at a disadvantage in the US labour market, still exists. The size of the 
workforce was hypothesised to affect female executive board representation. However, the 
effect was limited to those companies which already employed at least one female 
executive officer. Likewise, the positive impact of high turnover rates among executive 
board members on female board representation, which was associated with a greater 
precariousness of leadership positions, vanished in the reduced sample. Therefore, my 
findings indicate that although a large company size may be advantageous to women’s 
career perspectives, it is insufficient to ensure equal opportunities. Instead, other 
mechanisms, unrelated to establishment size, must be responsible for the observed 
differences in employment practices among major US corporations. 
The initial literature review identified the glass cliff phenomenon as such a 
discriminating mechanism. It constitutes a combination of stereotypical beliefs about 
women’s leadership abilities and related market pressure not to appoint women to the 
executive board. The test of Hypothesis 3 produced results in support of the glass cliff 
theory but also revealed that discriminatory employment practices are not uniformly 
distributed across US corporations. In light of Haslam’s (2010) theory, it is possible that 
the vicious circle of perceived underperformance of female executives and their 
assignment to precarious positions may be overcome if a woman is appointed to the 
executive board and markets realise that financial performance is not declining thereafter. 
Stakeholders may interpret any subsequent appointment of women to the executive board 
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as a sign of greater gender equality within the company rather than as a harbinger of a 
looming crisis.  
Contrary to my initial assumptions, the attitude towards women in top management 
is not uniform across corporate America. The rejection of the token theory demonstrates 
that companies do not base decisions to employ additional women as executive officers on 
the prior presence or absence of a female executive in the firm. Likewise, the queen bee 
syndrome, which would impair the appointment of additional women to the executive 
board, could be exposed as a modern myth. The results of my analyses justify moderate 
optimism regarding the future of women in top management since they indicate that 
women support, rather than hinder, each other in their career advancement. Furthermore, 
the attitude towards women in leadership positions appears to improve in companies after 
the appointment of a female executive, which implies the possible existence of a “reverse” 
or “positive” token effect. 
Apart from the glass cliff phenomenon and tokenism, I also attempted to examine the 
hypothesised causal connection between female executive board representation and certain 
phenomena related to corporate culture, such as the intensity of market competition, 
financial risks and innovative pressure, by using establishment age as a proxy. The attempt 
was unsuccessful, which could mean the nonexistence of such effects. However, it could 
also motivate future research to apply more sophisticated models and gather additional 
data in order to investigate the role of corporate culture more thoroughly. Specifically, the 
strong positive effect which female CEOs appear to have on the likelihood of appointment 
of additional women to the executive board corroborates previously mentioned theoretical 
findings, according to which the commitment of a company’s top management is 
indispensable for achieving greater gender equality. 
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Effects Related to Company Size 
Company size was found to have a positive effect on female executive board 
representation in the case of non-discriminatory employers. The literature review identified 
flexible workplace arrangements as being influenced by firm size since larger employers 
have more resources available to support staff and can better utilise economies of scale to 
provide on-site or off-site day care, extended periods of leave and support female 
employees in their re-integration into professional life. As a result of their societal role, 
women are more likely to experience certain obstacles in their professional development, 
particularly during midlife. Organisational structures may alleviate the impact of such 
impediments, which are related to childbearing, childrearing and elderly care and 
frequently exacerbated by lacking support from spouses and family members.  
Likewise, formal mentoring and networking initiatives are believed to be associated 
with firm size as large companies are characterised by a relatively higher degree of 
formalisation of procedures and greater objectivity, which are required for the effective 
implementation and evaluation of the aforementioned programmes. However, as discussed 
in the previous chapter, a large company size alone does not guarantee the success of HR 
development programmes. In order to be successful in facilitating the advancement of 
female professionals, company leadership must be honestly committed to developing 
female leadership potential. Furthermore, clear targets must be formulated and 
responsibilities must be defined.  
With increasing company size outside pressure to legitimise procedures also 
increases because large firms carry responsibilities for a disproportionately large number 
of employees. Large firms are also more thoroughly scrutinised by the general public as 
they are known to a greater number of people and are more frequently mentioned in the 
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media. Furthermore, the number of shareholders increases with a larger workforce10, which 
implies a greater probability that shareholders may exercise pressure through shareholder 
resolutions and other instruments. However, although firm size is undoubtedly a factor 
determining the importance of sensitive CSR-related issues, it is not directly related to 
female executive board representation for the majority of US corporations. It is possible 
that gender equality in top management is currently perceived as less controversial 
compared to other topics associated with CSR, such as environmental sustainability, 
human rights or the ethical use of social media (Mohin, 2012). 
 
The Role of Executive Compensation Schemes 
The results of my analysis provide no indication that female executives are employed 
by companies characterised by lower average compensation levels for the executive board. 
However, this finding does not necessarily mean that female executives are compensated 
equally to their male colleagues since compensation levels were calculated at the corporate 
level. My study does not consider possible compensation-related discrimination within 
companies and, therefore, does not conflict with the extensive body of literature on the 
gender pay gap. However, the study does reveal that female executives may be more risk-
averse by avoiding employment at firms offering steep tournament schemes. This finding 
supports the widely accepted opinion among scholars that women are more risk-averse 
than men. However, a closer examination of compensation spreads on senior management 
levels below the executive board would be required in order to establish whether female 
managers really behave in a more risk-averse way than their male colleagues in tournament 
settings. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 In the sample used for this study the number of employees in a company and the number of shareholders 
are positively correlated (r = .23 ***). 
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Nevertheless, the study findings regarding risk preferences of female executives have 
certain implications for major corporations which attempt to promote more women to top 
management positions. Since women may avoid steep tournaments due to the greater risk 
regarding personal finances, companies may adapt their compensation schemes 
accordingly by reducing tournament prizes in order to attract more female job candidates. 
However, this seemingly simple solution would obviously result in a reduction in the 
overall strength of pecuniary incentives. The results indicate that base salary would have to 
be increased following a reduction in incentive intensity in order to maintain a constant 
level of job attractiveness for more risk-averse employees. In consequence, the new 
compensation scheme would not be optimal for men, assuming that any firm’s 
compensation scheme was initially optimised for the less risk-averse male executive board 
members. 
Yet another possible solution for this problem is to offer alternative compensation 
packages upon employment. This compensation model could ensure an optimum effort 
supply from all executives, irrespective of their gender, by considering individual risk 
preferences. However, problems may still occur if managers competing in different 
compensation schemes become envious of each other. Envy may increase individuals’ 
effort supply if contestants attempt to outperform one another in order to secure the 
tournament prize for themselves (Brown et al., 2008; Loewenstein et al., 1989). However, 
if certain employees, e.g. female executives, cannot win the tournament because they opted 
out of it, the effects of envy may become counterproductive. The envious but, nevertheless, 
highly risk-averse employee could be stuck in a dilemma: On the one hand, he or she is 
likely to be disinclined to accept greater risks regarding their individual compensation. On 
the other hand, feelings of frustration may arise because of the inability to win a large 
bonus and attain the concomitant appreciation in social status (Kragl & Schmid, 2009). 
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Excessive inequalities in the remuneration of executives in a company may result in a 
collapse of the entire incentive system as highly risk-averse employees could lose the 
motivation to exert themselves for their employer. In practice, female executive officers 
may resign their jobs or, at the very least, resign internally. 
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Concluding Remarks 
This study investigated the impact of organisational characteristics on female 
executive board representation in major US corporations. It revealed that establishment 
size has a positive effect on the presence of female executives, implying that companies 
which permit flexible workplace arrangements and offer formal mentoring and networking 
programmes are more successful in promoting female management professionals’ career 
advancement in their organisations. The responsiveness and flexibility of employment 
conditions also includes offering alternative compensation schemes. However, the latter 
measure may be problematic with regard to companies’ overall incentive systems. 
Furthermore, the study findings reveal the existence of gender-based discrimination in the 
US labour market based upon the attractiveness of particular positions on the executive 
board. However, the study findings reject the implications of tokenism and give substantial 
reason to assume that women in top management positions facilitate the career 
advancement of their female colleagues and subordinates.  
Since this study was conducted among S&P 500 companies, the results and 
conclusions are almost certainly generalisable to other large companies in the United 
States. The implications may also be valid for companies in other industrialised regions of 
the world. Although Western European cultures differ from US American culture in 
various aspects, management structures in sizable private enterprises are relatively similar. 
Furthermore, as a result of progressing globalisation, corporate practices of large 
companies may be expected to become increasingly similar. Therefore, this study may 
contain a series of findings regarding the role of companies in facilitating equal 
employment and development opportunities for female professionals, which may be 
valuable for researchers and practitioners alike. 
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This study also has a number of limitations. First and foremost, it did not consider 
the dimension of race or ethnicity since this would have exceeded the scope of a master’s 
thesis. However, existing literature shows that gender-related effects may vary strongly 
across ethnic groups (e.g. Kalev et al., 2006). Furthermore, certain information regarding 
executive officers’ personal characteristics, such as average age or the level of educational 
attainment, could not be incorporated into the empirical models due to lack of available 
data. Such data might have been useful for increasing the validity of the specified models. 
Finally, the cross-sectional design of the study fails to capture effects related to certain 
developments over the course of time. Future research might utilise slightly more 
sophisticated statistical methods. For example, time series analyses or panel studies would 
help to determine the effects of employing a single female executive on the appointment of 
additional female executives more precisely. Apart from these limitations, future research 
may attempt to deconstruct the role of corporate social responsibility in greater detail. 
Furthermore, the relatively recent theory on the role of envy in relational employment 
contracts requires additional investigation in light of possible effects on women’s career 
advancement. Specifically, an analysis of compensation spreads at middle and senior 
management levels might improve our understanding of the role of tournament schemes 
regarding female board representation. Finally, the existence of systemic differences 
between discriminatory and non-discriminatory employers should be investigated more 
thoroughly. 
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Appendix A 
Full Sample Diagnostics 
Figure 7. Histogram of density function for dependent variable in full sample. 
!
Figure 8. Test of goodness of fit of full sample analysis. 
Note. Conducted for Model 4 of full sample regression analysis. Quality of prediction 
deteriorates with increasing distance between the two lines. 
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Appendix B 
Reduced Sample Diagnostics 
Figure 9. Histogram of density function for dependent variable in reduced sample. 
!
Figure 10. Test of goodness of fit of reduced sample analysis. 
Note. Conducted for Model 4 of reduced sample regression analysis. Quality of prediction 
deteriorates with increasing distance between the two lines. 
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Appendix C 
Abstract (Deutsch) 
Die vorliegende Masterarbeit untersucht den Einfluss von Unternehmenseigenschaften auf 
die Präsenz weiblicher Vorstände in großen US-amerikanischen Unternehmen. Die 
untersuchten Unternehmenseigenschaften dienen dabei als Proxys für nicht unmittelbar 
beobachtbare offizielle und inoffizielle Personalpraktiken in US-amerikanischen 
Unternehmen. Die beobachteten Unterschiede zwischen den verschieden Unternehmen 
offenbaren positive als auch negative Einflüsse dieser Unternehmenspraktiken auf die 
Karriereentwicklung von Managerinnen in den Vereinigten Staaten. Für die empirische 
Analyse wurden Daten zu Unternehmen im S&P 500 Index aus den S&P-Datenbanken 
Compustat Fundamentals Annually und Compustat Execucomp erhoben. Anschließend 
wurde im Rahmen einer statistischen Querschnittsanalyse eine Reihe von Regressionen 
durchgeführt. Die Ergebnisse dieser Arbeit legen nahe, dass die Mehrzahl US-
amerikanischer Großunternehmen Kandidatinnen für Vorstandsposten auf Grundlage der 
Attraktivität der ausgeschriebenen Stellen diskriminiert. Darüber hinaus zeigen die 
Ergebnisse, dass bestimmte Personalpraktiken, die mit größerer Wahrscheinlichkeit in 
relativ großen Unternehmen zu finden sind, die Präsenz von Frauen im Vorstand erhöhen. 
Ferner bestätigt die vorliegende Arbeit frühere Forschungsergebnisse, indem die 
Ergebnisse nahe legen, dass weibliche Vorstände im Vergleich zu ihren männlichen 
Kollegen möglicherweise stärker risikoavers im Bezug auf ihr persönliches Einkommen 
sind. Des Weiteren widerlegen die Ergebnisse die Existenz von Token-Effekten. Es 
existiert eine Reihe von Einschränkungen im Bezug auf die Ergebnisse dieser Arbeit. Der 
ethnische Hintergrund und eine Reihe weiterer persönlicher Eigenschaften von 
Vorstandsmitgliedern bleiben unbeobachtet. Außerdem lässt die statistische 
Querschnittsanalyse, die bei der vorliegenden Arbeit zur Anwendung kommt, temporale 
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Effekte außer Acht. Obwohl das Sample ausschließlich aus US-amerikanischen 
Unternehmen besteht, ist es dennoch wahrscheinlich, dass die aus der Analyse 
gewonnenen Erkenntnisse auf viele andere Staaten zumindest teilweise sinngemäß 
zutreffen. Aus praktischer Sicht legt diese Arbeit nahe, dass es für weibliche Vorstände 
von Vorteil sein könnte bei relativ großen Unternehmen beschäftigt zu sein. Kandidatinnen 
für Vorstandsposten werden jedoch häufiger als ihre männlichen Kollegen in heikle 
Positionen berufen, die ein höheres Misserfolgsrisiko mit sich bringen. Entgegen den 
Annahmen der Token-Theorie, scheinen Frauen in Topmanagementpositionen die 
Karriereentwicklung ihrer Kolleginnen zu fördern. Aus unternehmerischer Sicht könnten 
Arbeitgeber, die bemüht sind die Frauenquote auf Vorstandsebene zu erhöhen, die 
Ergebnisse dieser Arbeit heranziehen und ihre Personalpraktiken dementsprechend 
anpassen. Arbeitgeber könnten insbesondere ihre Gehaltssysteme für die Vorstandsebene 
überarbeiten, um Arbeitskonditionen attraktiver für weibliche Führungskräfte zu gestalten. 
Aus wissenschaftlicher Sicht leistet diese Arbeit einen Beitrag zur Untersuchung der Rolle 
von Arbeitgebern im Bezug auf die Gleichberechtigung der Geschlechter im Arbeitsleben. 
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Appendix D 
Curriculum Vitae  
Karol Bartecki, BA 
Education 
2008 – 2012 MSc in International Management 
 University of Vienna – Department of Business Administration 
 Major in Personnel Economics and HR Management 
Jul./Aug. 2010 Summer School of Polish Language and Culture 
 Jagiellonian University in Krakow 
2007/2008 Japanese Studies 
 University of Vienna – Department of East Asian Studies 
2006/2007 ERASMUS – Exchange Semester 
 Cracow University of Economics 
 Focus on business in transitional economies 
Jul. 2006 Summer School of Russian Language and Culture 
 Academy of Labour & Social Relations in Moscow 
2004 – 2007  BA in International Business Relations summa cum laude 
 University of Applied Sciences in Eisenstadt (Austria)  
 Core subjects: Business Administration, Marketing, European Studies 
2003 Diploma from Austrian secondary school summa cum laude 
 
Language Skills 
English Near-native proficiency 
 Cambridge Certificate of Proficiency in English 
 English for business & academic purposes 
German Native proficiency 
Polish Native proficiency 
Russian Fluent 
 Good knowledge of Russian for business purposes 
Japanese Basic level of command 
 Knowledge of Japanese culture & etiquette 
Latin and Ancient Greek 
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Appendix E 
Lebenslauf 
Karol Bartecki, BA 
Ausbildung 
2008 – 2012 Masterstudium Internationale Betriebswirtschaft 
 Universität Wien – Betriebswirtschaftszentrum 
 Kernfachkombination Personalökonomik 
Jul./Aug. 2010 Sommeruniversität für polnische Sprache und Kultur 
 Jagiellonenuniversität Krakau 
2007/2008  Bachelorstudium Japanologie 
 Universität Wien – Institut für Ostasienwissenschaften 
2006/2007 ERASMUS – Auslandssemester 
 Wirtschaftsuniversität Krakau 
 Schwerpunkt: Wirtschaft in MOE-Reformländern 
Jul. 2006 Sommeruniversität für russische Sprache und Kultur 
 „Academy of Labour & Social Relations“ in Moskau 
2004 – 2007 Fachhochschul-Bachelorstudiengang Internationale 
Wirtschaftsbeziehungen  
 Fachhochschulstudiengänge Burgenland Ges.m.b.H.  
in Eisenstadt (Österreich) 
 Abschluss mit ausgezeichnetem Erfolg 
 Kernfächer: BWL, Marketing, europäische Entwicklung und Integration 
2003 Matura (Abitur) mit ausgezeichnetem Erfolg 
 
Sprachkenntnisse 
Deutsch  Muttersprache 
Englisch  verhandlungssicher 
 Cambridge Certificate of Proficiency in English 
 Wirtschaftsenglisch und Englisch im akademischen Kontext 
Polnisch  Muttersprache 
Russisch  fließend 
 gute Kenntnisse in Wirtschaftsrussisch 
Japanisch  erweiterte Grundkenntnisse  
 Kenntnisse von japanischer Kultur und Etikette 
Großes Latinum und Graecum 
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